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Federal Constitutions, Global Governance, and the Role of 
Forests in Regulating Climate Change† 
BLAKE HUDSON∗ 
Federal systems of government present more difficulties for international treaty 
formation than perhaps any other form of governance. Federal constitutions that 
grant subnational governments virtually exclusive regulatory authority over certain 
subject matter may constrain national governments during international 
negotiations—a national government that cannot constitutionally bind subnational 
governments to an international agreement cannot freely arrange its international 
obligations. While federal nations that grant subnational governments exclusive 
regulatory control obviously place value on stringent decentralization and the 
benefits it provides in those regulatory areas, the difficulty lies in striking a 
balance between global governance and constitutional decentralization in federal 
systems. Recent scholarship demonstrates that U.S. federalism, for example, may 
jeopardize international negotiations seeking to utilize certain mechanisms of 
global forest management to combat climate change, since subnational forest 
management is a regulatory responsibility reserved for state governments under 
current constitutional jurisprudence. This Article expands that scholarship by 
undertaking a comparative constitutional analysis of five other federal systems—
Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia. These nations, along with the United 
States, are crucial to climate and forest negotiations since they account for 54% of 
the world’s total forest cover. This Article reviews the constitutional allocation of 
forest regulatory authority between national and subnational governments in these 
nations to better understand potential complications that federal systems present 
for global climate governance aimed at forests. The Article concludes that federal 
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systems maintaining three key elements within their constitutional structure are 
most capable of agreeing to an international climate agreement that incorporates 
forests in a consequential manner—elements that facilitate successful 
implementation of a treaty on domestic scales while maintaining the recognized 
benefits of decentralized forest management at the local level: (1) national 
constitutional primacy over forest management, (2) national sharing of 
constitutional forest management authority, and (3) adequate forest policy 
institutional enforcement capacity. The Article also establishes the foundation for 
further research assessing how the constitutional status quo of federal systems 
lacking key elements may be adjusted to achieve more effective climate and forest 
governance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Nations concerned about the difficulty of accommodating particular 
obligations within their constitutional schemes . . . may decline 
altogether to enter into a treaty that poses a serious risk of conflict with 
their constitutions. At the domestic level, well-grounded constitutional 
principles may be insurmountable . . . .1 
 
Federalism and a spirited foreign policy go ill together.2 
Recently, at the United Nations Global Conference on Environmental 
Governance and Democracy,3 numerous scholars expressed concern over political 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 103 COLUM. L. 
REV. 403, 461−62 (2003).  
 2. K.C. WHEARE, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 196 (1953).  
2012] THE ROLE OF FORESTS 1457 
 
disconnects among countries engaged in international negotiations on climate 
change, which is perhaps the most complex and challenging environmental issue of 
our time. Much of the conference discussion focused on strengthening institutions 
at various levels of governance to forge political will for action on climate change, 
either through the creation of new legislation facilitating climate change mitigation 
and adaptation or through improved enforcement of existing climate change laws.4 
Political will to create and enforce effective regulatory mechanisms on international 
and domestic scales is undoubtedly critical to effective global environmental 
governance, especially in an area as contentious as climate change. Another 
question, however, necessarily precedes an inquiry into political will—that is, does 
an adequate legal institutional framework exist within participant countries to 
ensure that in the presence of political will, if and when it occurs, international 
treaties can be successfully negotiated and implemented domestically? Without 
adequate legal institutions to effectively translate global politics into domestic 
policy, the most robust of international treaties will not be effectively implemented 
on domestic scales. 
Indeed, recent scholarship on international climate negotiations demonstrates 
how domestic governance limitations—specifically principles of federalism 
embedded in a country’s constitution—may complicate the implementation of a 
non-self-executing, legally binding climate change treaty that addresses global 
forest management via certain regulatory mechanisms, or perhaps even prohibit 
treaty formation altogether.5 In most nation-states, written constitutions are the 
ultimate source from which legal institutional strength flows.6 Countries with 
                                                                                                                 
 3. An earlier draft of this Article was accepted for presentation at the conference—held 
at Yale University on September 17–19, 2010, and sponsored by the United Nations Institute 
for Training and Research. Blake Hudson, Implications of Constitutional Forest Governance 
Disparities Among Federal States for International Climate Negotiations, UNITAR, 
http://conference.unitar.org/yale/democratic-institutions-and-environmental-sustainability.   
 4. Conference papers are available online. UNITAR, 
http://conference.unitar.org/yale/conference-papers.  
 5. See Blake Hudson & Erika Weinthal, Seeing the Global Forest for the Trees: How 
U.S. Federalism Can Coexist with Global Governance of Forests, 1 J. NAT. RESOURCES 
POL’Y RES. 353 (2009) [hereinafter Hudson I]; Blake Hudson, Climate Change, Forests, and 
Federalism: Seeing the Treaty for the Trees, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 363 (2011) [hereinafter 
Hudson II]. This scholarship has focused on the debate among American constitutional law 
scholars regarding the scope of the U.S. federal government’s treaty power, the history of the 
United States invoking federalism in order to inhibit treaty formation and participation, and 
the constitutional and judicial deference afforded to state and local governments—even in 
the presence of an international treaty—in the area of private property land-use regulation, 
including forest management regulations. Due to the great uncertainty surrounding the 
question of whether federalism limits the U.S. federal government’s ability to enter into and 
implement a legally binding treaty that would require direct regulation of forest management 
activities via prescriptive mechanisms, this scholarship suggested that as long as the current 
constitutional status quo remains, future treaties aimed at forest management should rely on 
voluntary, market-based mechanisms to facilitate U.S. participation and avoid domestic 
judicial challenges to treaty implementation by subnational units of government and private 
property owners in the United States. 
 6. See generally Martin Edelman, Written Constitutions, Democracy and Judicial 
Interpretation: The Hobgoblin of Judicial Activism, 68 ALB. L. REV. 585 (2005); see also 
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federal systems of government, like the United States, pose particularly acute 
challenges to a variety of international negotiations7 because federal systems are 
constitutionally decentralized8 and regulatory authority over treaty subject matter 
may be divided between the national and subnational units of government. Thus, 
national governments in federal systems may be constrained in treaty negotiations 
by subnational governments that challenge domestic treaty implementation as 
outside the scope of the national government’s constitutional authority.  
Take, for example, the role of the United States in climate change negotiations 
related to global forest management. The international community is increasingly 
focused on carbon sequestration via improved forest management as perhaps the 
most effective tool in battling climate change,9 and “realization of the significance 
of climate change impacts of greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation has brought renewed impetus to efforts to conserve and better 
manage forests globally.”10 The global benefits of responsible local forest 
management are enormous, as approximately 20% of annual global carbon 
emissions result from forest loss and degradation.11 This is more carbon than is 
emitted by the transportation sector each year.12 Indeed, sustainable forest 
                                                                                                                 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, An Overview of Court Review for Constitutionality in the United 
States, 57 LA. L. REV. 1019, 1025 (1997).  
 7. Such negotiations include those related to human rights, criminal law and 
punishment, commerce and trade, and the environment. Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power 
and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 402−08 (1998).  
 8. Scholars have stated that, 
federations use the principle of constitutional non-centralization rather than 
decentralization.  
. . . In other words, when independent states decide to create a federation and a 
federal system of government, they confer, generally through a constitution, 
certain specific responsibilities and authorities to the federal government in the 
interest of all states. . . . [F]or these reasons, use of the term decentralized is 
somewhat awkward in the case of federal governments.  
Hans M. Gregersen, Arnoldo Contreras-Hermosilla, Andy White & Lauren Phillips, Forest 
Governance in Federal Systems: An Overview of Experiences and Implications for 
Decentralization, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE 13, 
14–15 (Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano eds., 2005) (emphasis in original). 
 9. See infra notes 34−35 and accompanying text.  
 10. CONSTANCE L. MCDERMOTT, BENJAMIN CASHORE & PETER KANOWSKI, GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL FOREST POLICIES: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 4 (2010). 
 11. Id. at 6. 
 12. See ERIN C. MYERS, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, POLICIES TO REDUCE EMISSIONS FROM 
DEFORESTATION AND DEGRADATION (REDD) IN TROPICAL FORESTS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE 
ISSUES FACING THE INCORPORATION OF REDD INTO MARKET-BASED CLIMATE POLICIES 4 
(2007), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-07-50.pdf. For further 
information on the process of carbon sequestration, see Kenneth L. Denman & Guy 
Brasseur, Couplings Between Changes in the Climate System and Biogeochemistry, in 
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I 
TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE 500 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 2007), available at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-chapter7.pdf. In 2007, U.S. 
forests sequestered approximately 8% of total U.S. carbon emissions. ERIC M. WHITE & 
RALPH J. ALIG, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FOREST OWNERSHIP IN THE CONTEXT OF CARBON 
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management provides a variety of benefits along a spectrum from local to global 
scales. Local communities that effectively manage forest resources gain economic 
and environmental goods and services in the form of timber and food production, 
clean water, clean air, and biodiversity. In turn, the global community gains 
sequestration of carbon, as governments seek to battle the effects of climate change 
by including forest carbon in the ever-growing carbon credit market.13 Ultimately, 
global benefits derived from forests cannot materialize without the aggregation of 
responsible national and subnational forest management, demonstrating the 
inextricability of localized resource management decisions from global concerns 
and impacts.14  
Though participation of the United States is an important component to 
achieving these global benefits, the United States’s role in capitalizing on forest 
management to address climate change is complicated by its federalist form of 
governance. U.S. regulatory authority over forest management is constitutionally 
divided between the federal and state governments, with state governments 
responsible for regulating the nearly 65% of “local” U.S. forests that are in either 
state ownership (approximately 5%) or private ownership (approximately 60%).15 
Thus, even if the national government wished to obligate the United States to 
certain types of forest management requirements within an international climate 
treaty, it may arguably only do so on the 35% of nationally owned forests subject to 
its constitutional control. Consequently, the national government would be unable 
to effectively implement the treaty on nearly two-thirds of the United States’s 
forested lands, as any congressional implementing legislation would likely be 
challenged by state governments and private property owners as beyond Congress’s 
powers and as intruding upon a regulatory role constitutionally reserved to state 
governments. Thus, the United States would be in violation of its international 
obligations. By contrast, nonfederal nation-states with centralized, or “unitary,” 
forms of government may act without legal constraint during international climate 
negotiations—the lack of exclusive areas of subnational constitutional authority in 
                                                                                                                 
SEQUESTRATION AND BIOENERGY FEEDSTOCK PRODUCTION—A BRIEFING PAPER ON EXISTING 
RESEARCH AND RESEARCH NEEDS 9 (2010), available at 
http://www.fsl.orst.edu/lulcd/Publicationsalpha_files/White_Public_Private_Briefing.pdf. 
 13. Manish Bapna, Forests, Climate Change and the Challenge of REDD, WORLD 
RESOURCES INST., http://www.wri.org/stories/2010/03/forests-climate-change-and-challenge-
redd; see also MYERS, supra note 12, at 4. 
 14. It has been noted that,  
[f]orests are profoundly local. . . .  
   At the same time, forests are truly global. . . . 
. . . .  
   The challenge is to find a governance framework that can balance the various 
local, national and global interests related to forests. Everyone agrees that local 
groups should be allowed to come up with solutions that reflect their own needs 
and circumstances; but regional, national and global concerns must also be 
addressed.  
Wahjudi Wardojo, Foreword to THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND 
PEOPLE, supra note 8, at ix, ix.  
 15. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT OUTLOOK 3: PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 110 (2002), available at http://www.unep.org/geo/GEO3/ 
english/pdf.htm (follow “Forests” hyperlink). 
1460 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 87:1455 
 
these countries allows central governments to more freely obligate their respective 
nations to the dictates of a legally binding treaty.16  
Despite being overlooked by climate change scholars, federal constitutional 
limitations have potentially significant implications for global climate change or 
other negotiations related to forests. Though federal systems of government 
comprise only approximately 13% of the world’s governments, they maintain 
control over 70 to 80% of the world’s forests.17 As a result, the domestic 
constitutional governance structures of federal systems controlling important forest 
resources should be assessed to better understand potential complications that may 
arise during international climate negotiations related to forests. As the threat of 
climate change becomes more apparent and the resulting law and policy responses 
adjust over time, it will be crucial that world governments maintain, and are able to 
effectively utilize, every legal and policy tool at their disposal. A collaborative 
international response to climate change can certainly take many forms, ranging 
from individualized action by single nations, to transnational forms,18 to a legally 
binding global treaty. The utilization of a binding treaty, however, may be 
diminished if constitutionally decentralized federal systems controlling important 
forest resources are unable to fully participate. 
In addition to the United States, five federal systems in particular—Australia, 
Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia—account for 54% of the world’s total forest 
cover,19 and are thus vitally important to climate negotiations. Though a handful of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 16. “Unitary” systems of government “may have sub-national levels of governments; 
but these are not constitutionally empowered to make decisions on major government 
services and functions; rather, they are subordinate units.” Gregersen et al., supra note 8, at 
15. These subordinate units are intended to “balance the burden of governance.” Ian 
Ferguson & Cherukat Chandrasekharan, Paths and Pitfalls of Decentralization for 
Sustainable Forest Management: Experiences of the Asia Pacific Region, in THE POLITICS OF 
DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 63, 65. To be clear, 
national governments in unitary systems may certainly be politically thwarted by subnational 
government or interest group influence, but unitary governments maintain the legal authority 
to act if and when they politically choose to do so. In federal systems, on the other hand, 
even in the presence of national political will, any one subnational actor may challenge a 
national act as unconstitutional and may succeed in having it invalidated. 
 17. ARNOLDO CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, HANS M. GREGERSEN & ANDY WHITE, CTR. 
FOR INT’L FORESTRY RES., FOREST GOVERNANCE IN COUNTRIES WITH FEDERAL SYSTEMS OF 
GOVERNMENT: LESSONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION 1 (2008), available at  
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/GovBrief/GovBrief0739E.pdf. There are 
approximately 167 unitary systems of government, while there are only 26 federal systems 
of government. Federalism by Country, F. OF FEDERATIONS, 
http://www.forumfed.org/en/federalism/by_country/index.php.  
 18. These may include voluntary or other arrangements between groups of nations or 
nongovernmental organizations. 
 19. Of the world’s approximately 4 billion hectares of forest, Australia maintains 165 
million hectares; Brazil, 493 million hectares; Canada, 310 million hectares; Russia, 809 
million hectares; and the United States, 302 million hectares. JACEK P. SIRY, FREDERICK W. 
CUBBAGE, & DAVID H. NEWMAN, XIII WORLD FORESTRY CONG., GLOBAL FOREST 
OWNERSHIP: IMPLICATIONS FOR FOREST PRODUCTION, MANAGEMENT, AND PROTECTION 3 
(2009), available at http://www.pefc.org/images/stories/documents/external/global_forest 
2012] THE ROLE OF FORESTS 1461 
 
scholars have provided descriptive, comparative analyses of the effects of resource 
management decentralization in federal nation-states,20 scholars have failed to 
adequately assess the potential limiting effects of federal nation-state domestic 
constitutional constraints on international climate negotiations. Regardless of past 
and present political impacts on climate treaty formation, such as insufficient 
domestic political will or political disagreements between the developed and 
developing world,21 such an assessment is clearly warranted to determine whether a 
sufficient legal institutional framework exists in federal systems to facilitate the full 
range of market-based and regulatory options within international agreements that 
incorporate forests. If the constitutional framework in a federal system limits the 
national government’s authority to effectively implement a treaty on a subject 
matter reserved to subnational governments, a more important question will be how 
to craft constitutional approaches in these systems that best facilitate international 
agreement. 
An equally important question is how to balance global climate and forest 
governance with the benefits that decentralized forest management provides on 
local scales. Though certain federal systems, like the United States, present 
challenges for national and international policy up the ladder of forest resource 
governance, those same systems may more readily facilitate benefits on local scales 
down the ladder. Indeed, constitutionally decentralized federal systems provide a 
variety of governance benefits for local resource managers.22 Balancing the 
provision of global forest goods and services (such as climate change mitigation) 
via the implementation of international agreements with the provision of national 
and local goods via sustainable decentralized forest policy is a particularly 
challenging task within federal systems.  
This Article uses the lens of climate change, and the role of forest management 
in facilitating climate change solutions, to explore the realities of balancing 
domestic constitutional federalism with both global environmental governance and 
sustainable national and local forest management. The Article does so by assessing 
how the division of regulatory authority over forests between national and 
subnational governments in the above federal systems may affect global climate 
negotiations. More specifically, the Article analyzes whether—and to what 
degree—these federal countries maintain adequate constitutional capacity to enter 
into a viable climate treaty including forest management, to successfully implement 
such a treaty domestically, and to do so in a way most conducive to capturing the 
benefits of decentralized forest policy. Included in this assessment is a review of 
the split in public and private ownership of forests, which is of critical importance 
because different levels of government in federal systems maintain constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
_ownership_FD.pdf. India maintains seventy-seven million hectares. INDIAN INST. OF FOREST 
MGMT., NATIONAL FOREST POLICY REVIEW: INDIA 111, available at 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/AC921E/AC921E04.pdf. 
 20. See generally CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17; HANS GREGERSEN, 
ARNOLDO CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA, ANDY WHITE, & LAUREN PHILLIPS, CTR. FOR INT’L 
FORESTRY RES., FOREST GOVERNANCE IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW OF EXPERIENCES 
AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DECENTRALIZATION (2004), available at 
http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/interlaken/Interlaken_pre-paper.pdf; THE 
POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8. 
 21. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. 
 22. See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
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regulatory authority over forests depending on whether the forests are publicly or 
privately owned. The split in national/subnational authority and public/private 
forest ownership can be represented as two axes of disparity among federal systems 
in the area of forest management, with different federal systems falling into 
different quadrants. Figure 1 below provides a visualization of the widely divergent 
positions from which federal nation-states approach international climate 
negotiations aimed at forests.  
 
 
 
Where a federal system falls along these axes affects its legal domestic treaty 
implementation capabilities, as well as the political will it maintains to negotiate a 
treaty in the first instance. As explained below, the U.S. and Canadian national 
governments have extremely limited control over direct forest management 
activities on both state/provincial forestlands and private forestlands because 
“constitutional primacy” over decentralized forest policy remains with the 
subnational states or provinces. While these systems obviously place value on 
constitutionally decentralized forest governance, their chosen constitutional 
structure makes it very difficult to bind subnational governments to specific forest 
management directives via international treaty. By contrast, the Brazilian and 
Russian national governments maintain far more authority over forest resources 
relative to subnational governments, thus giving those countries what may be 
termed “national constitutional primacy” over decentralized forest policy. 
Furthermore, 75% of Brazil’s forests, 60% of the United States’s forests, and 26% 
of Australia’s forests are privately owned, whereas 93% of forests are publicly 
owned in Canada, 92% in Russia, and 97% in India23—further complicating global 
forest governance negotiations among federal systems. Ultimately, because 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 165, 199, 222, 240, and 267. 
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different levels of government, with different levels of constitutional authority, may 
directly regulate different categories of forest ownership, federalism and property-
rights complications have the potential to adversely impact future climate 
negotiations among federal systems. This Article aims to identify potential 
federalism-based legal impediments to future climate negotiations by analyzing the 
constitutional structures of these federal nation-states—a key step toward assessing 
how to craft constitutional approaches in federal systems that best facilitate both 
international agreement on climate and effective domestic forest policy.  
The Article proceeds in four parts. First, in order to explain the foundational 
research upon which this Article builds and establish the context for subsequent 
comparative analysis, Part I summarizes prior research on domestic constitutional 
constraints on international climate negotiations arising out of the U.S. 
constitutional structure. Part II introduces and analyzes three key elements of 
federal constitutional structure that most readily facilitate the formation of an 
international climate agreement aimed at forest management activities, its 
successful implementation at the domestic level, and preservation of the benefits of 
decentralized forest policy. In other words, the presence of all three elements 
allows federal systems to strike a difficult balance given the realities of federalism, 
international negotiations on forests, and the need to sustainably manage forest 
resources across scales. These elements are: (1) national government constitutional 
primacy over national and subnational forest policy, (2) national government 
sharing of its constitutional authority over forest policy with subnational units of 
government, and (3) forest policy institutional enforcement capacity.24  
Part III next surveys and provides a comparative analysis of the constitutional 
division of forest regulatory authority between national and subnational 
governments and the allocation of forest ownership in Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
India, and Russia (with comparative reference to the United States)—thus 
describing which key elements discussed in Part II are currently retained by these 
systems.25 Part IV summarizes the findings presented in Part III, explaining that 
each federal system analyzed maintains some combination of these three elements 
and that those with all three provide the constitutional framework most conducive 
to negotiating and successfully implementing an international climate treaty aimed 
at forests, while also capturing the benefits of decentralized federal forest policy. 
Part IV also situates these federal systems within a recently articulated policy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 24. Elements one and three are legal in nature, arising out of a federal system’s 
constitutional order. Systems maintaining these two elements are most capable of entering 
into and successfully implementing an international agreement. The second element is 
political in nature, and federal systems maintaining this element most readily facilitate the 
well-recognized benefits of decentralized forest policy—which unsurprisingly track the 
recognized benefits of having a federal system of government in the first place. 
 25. It was not within the scope of this Article to assess every federal system controlling 
important forest resources. These five countries, however, along with the United States, 
account for 54% of the world’s total forest cover. SIRY ET AL., supra note 19 and 
accompanying text. Nonetheless, the findings, conclusions, and implications of the research 
presented in this Article are equally applicable to other federal systems, and it is my hope 
that scholars will undertake full assessment of other federal systems controlling forest 
resources.  
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formulation and implementation matrix, which provides a framework for analyzing 
the consequences of federal systems lacking key elements, with both domestic and 
international implications. This Article concludes by suggesting further research 
aimed at assessing solutions to the absence of key elements in certain federal 
systems. 
I. IMPACTS OF U.S. FEDERALISM ON INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AND FOREST 
NEGOTIATIONS 
Though the international community has increasingly focused on global 
standardization of forest management practices, particularly regarding the role of 
forests in combating climate change, efforts over the past two decades to achieve 
harmonization of national and local forest practices within a legally binding 
international treaty have failed.26 This failure is in part due to political disconnects 
                                                                                                                 
 
 26. Since the late 1980s, countries supporting global governance of forests have made 
numerous attempts to negotiate a legally binding international forest treaty, though each has 
failed. Various international fora have facilitated these negotiations: the 1992 U.N. 
Conference on the Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro; four sessions 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) between 1995 and 1997; four rounds of the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) between 1997 and 2000; and most recently, 
numerous sessions of the United Nations Forum on Forests (UNFF) in the 2000s. Radoslav 
S. Dimitrov, Detlef F. Sprinz, Gerald M. DiGiusto & Alexander Kelle, International 
Nonregimes: A Research Agenda, 9 INT’L STUD. REV. 230, 243 (2007); accord Deborah S. 
Davenport & Peter Wood, Finding the Way Forward for the International Arrangement on 
Forests: UNFF-5, -6 and -7, 15 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT’L ENVTL. L. 316, 316 (2006); 
S. Guéneau & P. Tozzi, Towards the Privatization of Global Forest Governance?, 10 INT’L 
FORESTRY REV. 550, 552 (2008). The timeline for post-1992 forest negotiations has been 
described as follows:  
International forest policy negotiations have often been characterized by 
political entrenchment . . . .  
. . . Since the failure at the 1992 [UNCED] in Rio de Janeiro to achieve a 
legally binding forest convention, several fora have been developed in order to 
allow international forest policy discussions to continue . . . .  
. . . .  
. . . [But a] convention specifically addressing forests eluded consensus. . . . 
[T]he [IPF] was established as an expert body under the UN Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD), with a 2-year work programme intended to 
combat deforestation and forest degradation. The IPF . . . led to the creation of 
the [IFF] in 1997 . . . . The UNFF was then formed, with a plan of action that 
centered on implementation of the IPF/IFF proposals for action. . . . [T]he 
creation of the UNFF had less to do with monitoring the implementation of the 
proposals for action than it had to do with compromise: the need to counter the 
disappointment of some at the lack of an agreement to negotiate a forest 
convention with the creation of a new, more permanent forum with a 
substantially higher level of political authority.  
Davenport & Wood, supra, at 316−17. The 2007 UNFF talks did result in a “Non-legally 
Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on Management, 
Conservation, and Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests,” which sought to 
promote sustainable forest management worldwide and international cooperation on global 
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between the developed and developing worlds, with the developing world 
expressing skepticism over attempted developed country efforts to curb the 
destruction of tropical rainforest.27 However, scholars have specifically cited the 
United States’s unwillingness to unequivocally support an international agreement 
as the primary factor driving the failure of global climate and forest negotiations.28 
U.S. intransigence is especially significant because the United States is widely 
considered to be the most influential country in global environmental governance 
negotiations, and thus U.S. participation is crucial to the success of any global 
environmental treaty.29  
U.S. leadership is especially crucial in the case of climate change negotiations 
directed at global forest management. The United States is one of the greatest 
emitters of atmospheric carbon in the world, maintaining the second highest total 
and per capita carbon emissions as of 2008.30 The United States also maintains the 
fourth-largest forest estate of any country on the globe, as 8% of the world’s forests 
are in the United States.31 Scholars have argued that, “most observers believe that a 
key element for a successful set of [climate] negotiations . . . is the adoption by the 
United States of a set of binding limits for U.S. greenhouse gas emissions . . . .”32 
Yet the United States has failed to set such limits. In fact, despite the key role the 
United States plays in global environmental governance generally, it participates in 
only one-third of existing international environmental agreements, failing to either 
sign or ratify many significant treaties. Importantly, the United States has refused 
to ratify the current guiding climate change treaty, the Kyoto Protocol.33 
                                                                                                                 
forest issues. G.A. Res. 62/98, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/98 (Jan. 31, 2008), available at 
http://www.fao.org/forestry/14717-03d86aa8c1a7426cf69bf9e2f5023bb12.pdf. Some 
scholars, however, claim that the instrument “looks unlikely to achieve any real 
consolidation of global forest governance.” Guéneau & Tozzi , supra, at 552.  
 27. The developing world has viewed a global forest treaty as a means for the developed 
world to raise trade barriers and to engage in “forest colonialism” by obligating the 
developing world to take economically detrimental action to protect tropical forests while 
refusing to enforce the same regulations on temperate and boreal forests. See Radoslav S. 
Dimitrov, Knowledge, Power, and Interests in Environmental Regime Formation, 47 INT’L 
STUD. Q. 123, 135 (2003). 
 28. See Deborah S. Davenport, An Alternative Explanation for the Failure of the 
UNCED Forest Negotiations, GLOBAL ENVTL. POL., Feb. 2005, at 105; see also Radoslav S. 
Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms: States, Institutions and Global Forest Politics, GLOBAL ENVTL. 
POL., Nov. 2005, at 1. 
 29. See Davenport, supra note 28; Dimitrov, supra note 27.  
 30. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,  
http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/science/each-countrys-share-
of-co2.html. 
 31. Gerald A. Rose, Douglas W. MacCleery, Ted L. Lorensen, Gary Lettman, David C. 
Zumeta, Mike Carroll, Timothy C. Boyce & Bruce Springer, Forest Resources 
Decision-Making in the US, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND 
PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 238, 238. 
 32. Christophe A.G. Tulou, Michael L. Goo, Patrick A. Parenteau & John Costenbader, 
Climate Change and the Marine Environment, in OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW AND POLICY 
571, 586 (Donald C. Baur, Tim Eichenberg & Michael Sutton eds., 2008). 
 33. See Katrina L. Fischer, Harnessing the Treaty Power in Support of Environmental 
Regulation of Activities that Don’t “Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce”: Recognizing 
the Realities of the New Federalism, 22 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 167, 199 (2004). The Kyoto 
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Despite the failure of the United States to take a leading role in past climate and 
forest talks, the international community—including the UNFF and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)—continues to 
move toward harnessing global forest management as a means of combating 
climate change, primarily through the inclusion of market-based incentives to 
achieve “Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation” 
(REDD).34 Despite high hopes, a post-Kyoto climate agreement failed to 
materialize during Climate Change Conference number fifteen (COP-15) in 
Copenhagen at the end of 2009. While there is increasing inertia toward direct 
inclusion of forest management within any future climate agreement that may 
arise,35 the politics of global climate change negotiations continue to be contentious 
within the United States. This contentiousness is perhaps best evidenced by the 
United States’s persistent failure to pass domestic climate change legislation.36 
With the 2010 midterm congressional elections resulting in the largest power-shift 
in the House of Representatives since 1948—ushering in representatives opposed 
to climate cap and trade—the politics of regulatory action on climate change is 
unlikely to improve in the near term.37 
                                                                                                                 
Protocol (adopted in 1997 and entering into force in 2005), is a multilateral environmental 
agreement that assigned binding carbon reduction targets and timeframes to “Annex I,” or 
industrialized nations, as well as general commitments for all signatory nations. K. Levin, C. 
McDermott & B. Cashore, The Climate Regime as Global Forest Governance: Can Reduced 
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) Initiatives Pass a ‘Dual 
Effectiveness’ Test?, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 538, 543–44 (2008). The United States signed 
the Kyoto Protocol but the U.S. Congress never ratified it. Fischer, supra, at 199.  
 34. The UNFF, which concluded its 8th session in May 2009, is the primary forum for 
what may be termed “stand-alone” forest negotiations. Though these negotiations are outside 
the context of direct climate negotiations, they seek to develop a role for forests in 
combating climate change, promote sustainable forestry, and preserve forest ecosystem 
services. Additionally, the UNFCCC is increasingly discussing methods of addressing global 
forest management via a post-Kyoto climate treaty. See A. Angelsen, REDD Models and 
Baselines, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 465 (2008); T. Johns, F. Merry, C. Stickler, D. Nepstad, 
N. LaPorte & S. Goetz, A Three-Fund Approach to Incorporating Government, Public and 
Private Forest Stewards into a REDD Funding Mechanism, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 458 
(2008); A. Karsenty, S. Guéneau, D. Capistrano, B. Singer & J-L. Peyron, Summary of the 
Proceedings of the International Workshop “The International Regime, Avoided 
Deforestation and the Evolution of Public and Private Policies Towards Forests in 
Developing Countries” Held in Paris, 21-23rd November 2007, 10 INT’L FORESTRY REV. 
424 (2008); Levin et al., supra note 33.  
 35. See Levin et al., supra note 33, at 539. 
 36. See American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010) (Kerry-Lieberman Bill); 
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) 
(Waxman-Markey Bill); Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 2191, 110th 
Cong. (2007); Dingell-Boucher Cap-and-Trade Bill, INSTITUTE FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, 
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2008/10/07/dingell-boucher-cap-and-trade-bill/. 
 37. See Quinn Bowman & Chris Amico, Congress Loses Hundreds of Years of 
Experience—but Majority of Incumbents Stick Around, PBS (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/2010/11/congress-loses-hundreds-of-years-of-
experience—but-vast-majority-of-incumbents-stick-around.html; Renee Schoof, With GOP 
in Charge of House, Environmental Policy Will Shift, MCCLATCHY (Nov. 3, 2010), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/11/03/103149/with-gop-in-charge-of-house-
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But, what will happen if the United States decides to take domestic and 
international action on carbon? What if, in the future, the international community 
seeks to harness global forest management to combat climate change through more 
aggressive mechanisms than market-based incentives? Even if the United States 
were to gain the political will to tackle climate change in such a manner in the 
future, the precursor to this Article demonstrated that the U.S. Constitution 
establishes potential legal restrictions on its ability to enter into certain types of 
international agreements addressing climate change—specifically ones that seek to 
implement restrictions on land-use activities traditionally subject to state and local 
government regulatory authority, such as private forest management. In other 
words, the constitutional division of regulatory authority between the federal and 
state governments—that is, federalism—may act as a restraint on Congress’s 
Article II treaty power by limiting Congress’s ability to implement treaties through 
the passage of federal legislation that would intrude on a regulatory role reserved to 
the states under the U.S. Constitution.  
Private land-use regulation is just such a role,38 as state governments maintain 
the primary responsibility to regulate land use under their authority to exercise the 
“police power” for protection of the “general welfare.”39 Some have argued that the 
Tenth Amendment of the Constitution places limits on Congress’s regulatory 
authority “in ‘traditional areas of state and local authority,’ such as land use . . . .”40 
                                                                                                                 
environmental.html.  
 38. This assertion is made in the context of a recently developed theory of “Bimodal 
Federalism,” which seeks to highlight a disconnect in the scholarly literature regarding how 
U.S. federalism may operate or should normatively operate regarding some regulatory 
subject matter, and how it actually operates regarding other subject matter. See Blake 
Hudson, Reconstituting Land-Use Federalism to Address Transitory and Perpetual 
Disasters: The Bimodal Federalism Framework, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1991. This disconnect 
revolves around two different conceptions of how federalism operates, or normatively should 
operate, in the United States today—“dynamic federalism” and “dual federalism.” 
Proponents of dual federalism posit that “the states and the federal government inhabit[] 
mutually exclusive spheres of power.” Kirsten H. Engel, Harnessing the Benefits of Dynamic 
Federalism in Environmental Law, 56 EMORY L.J. 159, 175 (2006). Proponents of dynamic 
federalism, meanwhile,  
reject[] any conception of federalism that separates federal and state authority 
under the dualist notion that the states need a sphere of authority protected from 
the influence of the federal government” and posit that “federal and state 
governments function as alternative centers of power and any matter is 
presumptively within the authority of both the federal and the state governments.  
Id. at 176 (emphasis added). Yet, neither of these theories captures the complete descriptive 
picture of U.S. federalism today. Dynamic federalism may certainly be claimed as the status 
quo on many regulatory subject matters, and we may be in the midst of transition towards 
dynamic federalism on other subject matter. Yet remnants of dual federalism remain. Direct 
land-use regulatory authority, including private forest management, is one such remnant. The 
federal and state governments, in addition to the judiciary, operate as if there are separate 
spheres of governance, and the federal government is currently perceived as having no 
constitutional authority to prescriptively direct subnational land-use planning or private 
forest management. For further analysis on these points within the Bimodal Federalism 
framework, see Hudson, supra.  
 39. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
 40. James R. May, Constitutional Law and the Future of Natural Resource Protection, 
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These scholars have noted that “[t]he weight of legal and political opinion holds 
that this allocation of power in [the United States] leaves the states in charge of 
regulating how private land is used,”41 and that “[l]and use law has always been a 
creature of state and local law.”42 The seminal land use regulatory case of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty43 has been described as a “sweeping paean to the supremacy of state 
regulation over private property,”44 while the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
“the States’ traditional and primary power over land . . . use,”45 and that 
“[r]egulation of land use . . . is a quintessential state and local power.”46  
As noted above, domestic constitutional constraints such as state control over 
land-use regulation have important implications for international negotiations. Even 
in the absence of political complications that negatively impacted past climate 
negotiations, the United States, as well as other countries with which it might 
negotiate, may not be willing to enter into certain types of treaties addressing 
climate and forests in the presence of domestic constitutional limitations since a 
treaty that may not be legally implemented domestically will not be effective. 
Indeed, the United States has invoked federalism in past treaty negotiations on a 
number of subjects in order to avoid global agreements that might restrict 
traditional state regulatory authority—whether the United States had legitimate 
constitutional bases for doing so has become the subject of much debate among 
constitutional law scholars.47 It seems clear that, as a political matter, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
in THE EVOLUTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES LAW AND POLICY 124, 132 (Lawrence J. 
MacDonnell & Sarah F. Bates eds., 2010). 
 41. JOHN R. NOLAN, PATRICIA E. SALKIN & MORTON GITELMAN, LAND USE AND 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 17 (7th ed. 2008). 
 42. Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 335 (2003). 
 43. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 44. PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., PROPERTY LAW: OWNERSHIP, USE, 
AND CONSERVATION 967 (2006). 
 45. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 
(2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 
44 (1994) (“[R]egulation of land use [is] a function traditionally performed by local 
governments.”)). 
 46. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (emphasis added); see also 
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 768 n.30 (1982) (“[R]egulation of land use is perhaps 
the quintessential state activity.”) (emphasis added). For a more general discussion 
distinguishing the permissible, tangential influencing effects of U.S. federal statutes on state 
regulation of forests from potentially impermissible federal interference with primary state 
authority over forest management, see Hudson II, supra note 5.  
 47. Professor Bradley has noted that “in a number of instances in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, U.S. officials declined to enter into negotiations concerning private 
international law treaties because of a concern that the treaties would infringe on the 
reserved powers of the states.” Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American 
Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 131−32 (2000) (citing Kurt H. Nadelmann, 
Ignored State Interests: The Federal Government and International Efforts to Unify Rules of 
Private Law, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 323 (1954); see also HAROLD W. STOKE, THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL STATE 187–88 (1931). Additionally, in the past, the United 
States has invoked federalism and states’ rights to avoid international treaties regulating 
labor conditions. Bradley, supra, at 132. Perceived federalism limits on the U.S. government 
have also been credited with reducing the United States’s bargaining power during 
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Congress could certainly test the waters of federal regulatory authority—under the 
Commerce Clause or some other enumerated power—and seek to regulate subject 
matters previously regulated almost exclusively by state governments (an example 
being private forest management). Yet in the United States it seems that “legal 
perception becomes political reality,”48 as the government politically acts as if its 
hands are tied due to perceived legal constraints. 
As a general matter, U.S. constitutional law scholars are in heated disagreement 
as to whether constitutional federalism limitations restrain the treaty power 
established in Article II of the U.S. Constitution.49 In one camp are scholars 
asserting that the “new federalism”50 established by recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions51 confirms the existence of federalism restraints on the United States’s 
ability to implement international treaties requiring the passage of federal 
legislation that would be unconstitutional if passed in the absence of a treaty—such 
as legislation that intrudes into regulatory areas traditionally reserved for the states 
under the Constitution.52 This camp stands for the proposition that the treaty power 
should be subject to the same federalism limitations that apply to Congress’s other 
sources of legislative authority, such as the Commerce Clause, because “the federal 
government should not be able to use the treaty power . . . to create domestic law 
that could not be created by Congress” in the absence of a treaty.53 This view 
follows from Jeffersonian notions of the treaty power’s scope, as Thomas Jefferson 
himself wrote that “[the treaty power] must have meant to except out of these the 
rights reserved to the states; for surely the President and Senate cannot do by treaty 
                                                                                                                 
international negotiations, as the United States has sought both treaty exemptions to reduce 
state obligations, and concessions for states in domestic implementation. See Swaine, supra 
note 1, at 408–10. Examples include the United States’s direct opposition to the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, treaty exemptions for the states with a variety of human rights 
treaties and the Agreement on Government Procurement, and concessions to the states in 
domestic implementation of trade matters like the Uruguay Round Agreements Act. Id.  
 48. Hudson, supra note 38, at 2048. 
 49. For a thorough discussion of this disagreement and its implications, see Hudson II, 
supra note 5, at 405–13.  
 50. See generally Swaine, supra note 1. 
 51. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898 (1997); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 
U.S. 549 (1995); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 52. See Bradley, supra note 7; Bradley, supra note 47; Fischer, supra note 33; Duncan 
B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 
79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327 (2006); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the Treaty Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 1867 (2005); Swaine, supra note 1. 
 53. See Bradley, supra note 7, at 450. Bradley stated that, 
[u]nder this approach, the treaty power would not confer any additional 
regulatory powers on the federal government, just the power to bind the United 
States on the international plane. Thus, for example, it could not be used to 
resurrect legislation determined by the Supreme Court to be beyond Congress’s 
legislative powers, such as the legislation at issue in the recent New York, 
Lopez, Boerne, and Printz decisions.  
Id. at 456. Bradley clarifies, however, that his argument “is simply that if federalism is to be 
the subject of judicial protection—as the current Supreme Court appears to believe—there is 
no justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from such protection.” Id. at 
394 (emphasis in original). 
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what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way.”54 The 
implications of this view, of course, are that federalism limits “might leave the 
United States with a gap between its international treaty obligations and its ability 
to implement them . . . .”55 Even so, constitutional law scholars raise a compelling 
argument that “[i]f the national government is indeed supposed to be a creature of 
limited authority, shouldn’t the treaty power enjoy boundaries just like any 
other?”56 
Another camp of constitutional law scholars articulate the “nationalist” 
perspective, asserting that for domestic legislation implemented pursuant to an 
international treaty, the national government may claim regulatory authority even 
over subject matter traditionally regulated by state governments that would 
otherwise be beyond the reach of the national government in the absence of a 
treaty.57 This camp views the treaty power as an independent power delegated to 
the national government, as is the case with the Commerce Clause and other 
sources of federal authority. In this way, “nationalists” argue that just as there are 
no Tenth Amendment powers “reserved” exclusively for the states for activities 
that are found to constitute “commerce between the states” under the Commerce 
Clause, there are no Tenth Amendment powers “reserved” exclusively for the states 
for activities subject to an international treaty.58 For non-self-executing treaties that 
require domestic legislation that might otherwise be subject to federalism 
limitations, such as legislation outside the scope of the Commerce Clause or some 
other enumerated federal power, nationalists invoke the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, asserting that “it is quite clear that Congress has the power to adopt 
legislation executing the provisions of any valid treaty,” and that “[i]f the President 
and Senate have the power to conclude treaties on subjects that are beyond the 
scope of Congress’s legislative powers, then the Necessary and Proper Clause 
makes clear that Congress has the power to adopt legislation implementing the 
provisions of such treaties as domestic law.”59 
The “new federalist” versus “nationalist” debate over federalism and the treaty 
power is far from over, but its implications should not be overlooked in the global 
environmental governance context. Climate change negotiations aimed at forest 
practices provide an ideal set of circumstances for studying how the above 
constitutional debate plays out in international relations. Because the U.S. 
Constitution grants the national government the authority to negotiate treaties,60 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Thomas Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice: For the Use of the Senate 
of the United States, in JEFFERSON’S PARLIAMENTARY WRITINGS 353, 421 (Wilbur Samuel 
Howell ed., 1988). 
 55. Swaine, supra note 1, at 474. 
 56. Id. at 475.  
 57. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations 
of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). Golove 
also provides a thorough analysis of the intensity of the debate between new federalists and 
nationalists. See id. at 1076–81; see also Hollis, supra note 52, at 1330−31. 
 58. Golove, supra note 57, at 1087−88.  
 59. Id. at 1099. 
 60. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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while state and local governments maintain primary regulatory authority for land 
use activities like private forest management,61  
[t]he US’s governmental system of federalism, engrained in the US 
Constitution and receiving staunch protection by the US judiciary, 
causes domestic implementation of certain international forest 
governance scenarios to be more viable than others. . . . US federalism . 
. . represents a specific legal constitutional requirement for 
decentralization, whereby a national government is judicially required 
to divulge regulatory authority to sub-national units (the states) in the 
area of direct forest management.62 
Imagine, for instance, that the United States signed and ratified an international 
treaty under which the U.S. Congress agreed to pass domestic legislation 
establishing nationwide forest management mandates on publicly and privately 
owned forest lands. Such mandates might require maintaining partial forest cover 
on forested lands, implementing soil erosion reduction programs, establishing 
nationwide buffer zones in forested watersheds, or limiting fertilizer use.63 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. As scholars note, “[u]nder the US Constitution, the federal government has limited 
authority and responsibility; all other powers are reserved for the states. Forestland 
management and use was one such reserved power.” Rose et al., supra note 31, at 239. 
 62. Hudson I, supra note 5, at 354–55 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
Scholars have described the U.S. Constitution as establishing “a very limited concentration 
of powers in the nation’s central institutions. . . . [T]he original allocation of jurisdiction to 
the national government was . . . modest with the unspecified, but apparently broad, residue 
being left with the states.” Ronald L. Watts, The American Constitution in Comparative 
Perspective: A Comparison of Federalism in the United States and Canada, 74 J. AM. HIST. 
769, 769 (1987). It is true that, “[t]hough the balance of power between the state and federal 
governments shifts periodically in U.S. constitutional jurisprudence—thus leading to court 
‘protection’ of states’ rights to a greater or lesser degree than federal power—the judicial 
system resolutely protects the principle that is U.S. federalism.” Hudson II, supra note 5, at 
383 n.70. As noted by Professor Watts, “[i]n the United States there have been fluctuations 
in the relative strengths of the national and state governments . . . .” Watts, supra at 773. 
Nonetheless, “the courts and particularly the Supreme Court have come to play a prominent 
role through their exercise of judicial review to ensure the constitutionality of legislation and 
executive and administrative action relating to . . . the distribution of jurisdiction between the 
national and state governments.” Id. at 789. 
 63. Hudson I, supra note 5, at 358. The IPCC has stated that international agreements on 
forests could ensure the implementation of:  
[f]orest management activities to increase stand-level forest carbon stocks 
include harvest systems that maintain partial forest cover, minimize losses of 
dead organic matter (including slash) or soil carbon by reducing soil erosion, 
and by avoiding slash burning and other high-emission activities. Planting after 
harvest or natural disturbances accelerates tree growth and reduces carbon 
losses relative to natural regeneration. Economic considerations are typically 
the main constraint, because retaining additional carbon on site delays revenues 
from harvest. The potential benefits of carbon sequestration can be diminished 
where increased use of fertilizer causes greater N2O emissions. 
Gert Jan Nabuurs, Omar Masera, Kenneth Andrasko, Pablo Benitez-Ponce, Rizaldi Boer, 
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Congressional legislation implementing the treaty, however, would arguably be an 
impermissible intrusion into an area of state regulatory control, thus effectively 
prohibiting U.S. participation in the treaty. Based upon current constitutional 
understandings, states maintain direct regulatory authority over private forest 
management activities under their general “land use” regulatory authority.64 As a 
result, states are responsible for establishing stand density, reforestation, and 
riparian buffer zone requirements; governing clear-cutting practices; and 
implementing numerous other “best management practices” on state-owned and 
private forestlands.65 This division of subnational forest regulatory authority 
between the federal and state governments is especially problematic for the United 
States; even though central governments own approximately 86% of forests 
worldwide,66 the U.S. federal government only owns 35% of U.S. forestland.67 
State governments own 5% of U.S. forests, and private landowners own the 
remaining 60%—a significant variance from the global pattern of forest 
ownership.68 Furthermore, nearly 89% of U.S. timber is harvested from private 
lands.69 Thus, 
a global governance scenario that required that “within x number of 
years, treaty participants must increase and maintain forest area by 25 
percent and implement active carbon sequestration projects on 50 
percent of their forested lands” may not be viable under the U.S. federal 
system because the U.S. government arguably would be unable to 
ensure compliance with the mandate on even a majority of forested 
lands within its borders. . . . State governments would claim sole 
authority to pass laws prescribing increased forest density and carbon 
                                                                                                                 
Michael Dutschke, Elnour Elsiddig, Justin Ford-Robertson, Peter Frumhoff, Timo 
Karjalainen, Olga Krankina, Werner A. Kurz, Mitsuo Matsumoto, Walter Oyhantcabai, 
Ravindranath N.H., Maria José Sanz Sanchez & Xiaquan Zhang, Forestry, in CLIMATE 
CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 541, 551 (Bert Mertz et al. eds., 2007), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg3/en/ch9.html.  
 64. See supra note 61 and accompanying text; supra note 39. 
 65. See JAN G. LAITOS, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MARY C. WOOD & DANIEL H. COLE, 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 849 (2006). Despite maintaining the regulatory authority to do 
so, most states do not even legally place forest management standards upon private forest 
managers. Scholars have noted that “[a]lthough a few states have laws that regulate forest 
practices on private land, most rely upon voluntary best management practices and technical 
assistance.” Rose et al., supra note 31, at 238 (emphasis added).  
 66. See Arun Agrawal, Ashwini Chhatre & Rebecca Hardin, Changing Governance of 
the World’s Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1460, 1460 (2008). 
 67. U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, supra note 15, at 110. 
 68. See id. 
 69. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST FACTS AND HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (Sept. 2001), 
available at http://fia.fs.fed.us/library/briefings-summaries-overviews/docs/ForestFacts 
Metric.pdf. Carbon flux, or the net difference between carbon removal and carbon addition 
to the atmosphere, is 50% greater on public forestlands in the United States than on private 
forestlands, most likely resulting “from greater land use conversions and disturbance 
(including timber harvest) on private forests relative to public forests.” WHITE & ALIG, supra 
note 12, at 9–10. 
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sequestration requirements on the remaining 65 percent of forests either 
on private lands or in state ownership.70  
Whether federalism limits the U.S. treaty power in the case of forests and 
climate is further complicated by the fact that the seminal U.S. constitutional case 
on the issue provides little clarity, due to its narrow facts. Though decided in 1920, 
Missouri v. Holland71 remains the point of reference for determining the treaty 
power’s scope in allowing national government regulation of natural resources and 
other subject matter traditionally regulated by the states. Indeed, Professor Henkin 
framed Holland as “perhaps the most famous and most discussed case in the 
constitutional law of foreign affairs.”72  
Holland arose out of a treaty signed on December 8, 1916 by the United States 
and Great Britain, recognizing that “many species of birds in their annual 
migrations traversed certain parts of the United States and of Canada . . . were of 
great value as a source of food and in destroying insects injurious to vegetation, but 
were in danger of extermination through lack of adequate protection.”73 To 
implement the treaty domestically, the United States passed the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act (MBTA)74 to prohibit the killing, capturing, or selling of migratory 
birds covered by the treaty.75 The state of Missouri challenged the federal 
government’s authority to enforce the MBTA, arguing that the act 
unconstitutionally interfered with the rights reserved for the states under the Tenth 
Amendment,76 and additionally that states traditionally controlled the management 
of wildlife resources.77 The federal government responded by asserting the 
supremacy of its constitutional treaty power—and correspondingly all domestic 
legislation passed pursuant to it—over the state’s claimed authority.78 
The Supreme Court resolved the dispute by first noting the supremacy of federal 
laws passed pursuant to the treaty power established in Article VI of the 
Constitution, finding that “[i]f the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the 
validity of the [MBTA] under Article 1, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to 
execute the powers of the Government.”79 The Court found that the MBTA did not 
violate any specific portion of the Constitution, and should be upheld unless it was 
prohibited by the Tenth Amendment under the facts of the case.80 The Court stated 
that “[t]he language of the Constitution as to the supremacy of treaties being 
general, the question before us is narrowed to an inquiry into the ground upon 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Hudson II, supra note 5, at 400 (citation omitted). 
 71. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 72. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 190 (2d 
ed. 1996). 
 73. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. 
 74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006). 
 75. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431. 
 76. Id. at 430–31. 
 77. See id. at 430. 
 78. See id. at 432. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See id. at 433−34. 
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which the present supposed exception is placed,”81 and that “[n]o doubt the great 
body of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty 
may override its power. . . . [I]t only remains to consider the application of 
established rules to the present case.”82 The Court ultimately determined that the 
specific facts of the case did not warrant overturning the MTBA on Tenth 
Amendment grounds. In doing so, the Court focused on the migratory nature of the 
birds (being owned by no particular party) and the national interest at stake as 
weakening the state’s claim of sole regulatory authority over the resource.83 In 
other words, the resource at issue crossed international boundaries, and thus 
Congress could act without violating the Tenth Amendment since the resource 
could be adequately managed “only by national action in concert with that of 
another power.”84  
The narrow fact pattern presented in Holland, however, is distinguishable from 
that which would be presented by private forests. Private forest management has 
traditionally been considered a land use activity subject to the exclusive regulatory 
authority of state governments and otherwise reserved for the states under the 
Tenth Amendment.85 Furthermore, forests differ from wildlife because the federal 
government has never before sought regulatory inputs into direct private forest 
management practices, forests are owned by identifiable public and private entities, 
and forests are not migratory resources. Finally, “the history of state control over 
private forest management (and land use generally) demonstrates that the federal 
government customarily has not been considered a necessary party to private forest 
management—and forests are not ‘protected only by national action in concert with 
that of another power.’”86 As a result, the fact-specific nature of the Holland 
analysis, combined with recently revived principles of “new federalism,” 
potentially renders Holland of very little precedential value in defending domestic 
implementation of an international treaty prescribing private forest management 
standards.  
A number of scholars agree that Holland may be limited to its facts, noting that 
“although Holland has been construed as giving the treaty power complete 
immunity from federalism limitations, the decision itself can be read much more 
narrowly,”87 and that “there is a substantial risk that subject-matter limitations . . . 
[may be] applied to the exercise of the treaty power. While Missouri v. Holland 
may survive for the foreseeable future, it will likely be read narrowly.”88 Or, as 
summarized by one scholar, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. Id. at 432. 
 82. Id. at 434−35. 
 83. The Court noted that “[w]ild birds are not in the possession of anyone . . . [t]he 
whole foundation of the State’s rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of birds that 
yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand miles 
away.” Id. at 434. 
 84. Id. at 435 (emphasis added). 
 85. Rose et al., supra note 31, at 239; see supra text accompanying note 61. 
 86. Hudson II, supra note 5, at 417 (emphasis in original). 
 87. Bradley, supra note 7, at 459. 
 88. Swaine, supra note 1, at 412.  
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[T]he expansive, nationalist view of the treaty power is unlikely to 
survive sustained analysis intact and will likely be cabined by some 
type of limiting principle. . . . [T]he Supreme Court will be forced to 
reexamine in a serious way, for the first time in nearly eighty years, an 
ill-defined, poorly understood constitutional doctrine (the nationalist 
view) . . . . It only seems prudent to anticipate that instead of feeling 
inexorably bound by relatively moribund precedent, the Court will 
instead endeavor to assimilate the treaty power into the revived 
federalism that it has put forward with such frequency.89 
Yet another scholar is even more direct, stating that “Missouri v. Holland may be 
canonical, but it does not present a strong case for the application of stare decisis. It 
is wrongly decided and should be overruled.”90 
Ultimately, a strong argument exists that under current understandings of U.S. 
constitutional law the U.S. federal government would be constrained from entering 
into and implementing an international climate treaty that sought a certain threshold 
of control over forest management activities because nearly two-thirds of U.S. 
forests are under subnational regulatory authority.91 In this way, “U.S. federalism is 
predisposed to conflict with principles of international law, not only in the 
negotiation of treaties, but perhaps more importantly in the implementation of 
treaties governing areas considered the subject of traditional state authority, like 
forest management.”92 
The United States is not alone, however, in its status as a federal system 
potentially constrained in international climate negotiations by subnational units of 
government. Professor Swaine has noted that, “[f]ederal states not infrequently 
seek broader concessions based on the political feasibility of national 
implementation, but the arguments that have had purchase are based on more 
genuine constitutional limits. Much the same may be said with respect to . . . 
outright . . . refusals to participate based on federalism grounds.”93 Indeed, 
numerous other federal systems control important forest resources worldwide and 
present potential difficulties for international negotiations. As a result, a variety of 
countries at the negotiating table could each be legally constrained in domestic 
treaty implementation.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 89. Fischer, supra note 33, at 186. 
 90. Rosenkranz, supra note 52, at 1937. 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 15. As a short-term means of avoiding the 
negative effects of such a restraint, scholars have argued: 
it is apparent that . . . a global forest treaty based upon “traditional governance” 
and prescriptive mandates that may run afoul of federalism principles in the 
United States [should be avoided]. Market-based initiatives like REDD, forest 
certification, and ecosystem service transaction programs would provide the 
best opportunity to achieve global forest management goals and would do so 
with the uncompromised leadership and participation of the United States.  
Hudson II, supra note 5, at 428–29. 
 92. Hudson II, supra note 5, at 395. For a broader discussion on the tension between 
U.S. federalism and international law and treaty obligations, see id., Part II.D. 
 93. Swaine, supra note 1, at 445−46; see also Hollis, supra note 52, at 1327−28.  
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The next Part introduces and describes the three elements of federal 
constitutional orders that allow these systems to avoid such difficulties at the global 
scale while at the same time preserving the benefits of sustainable decentralized 
forest governance on local scales—a necessary precursor to Part III’s comparative 
analysis of the constitutional orders of Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, and Russia 
in the context of forest management. Part III’s analysis permits a determination of 
which of the three elements from Part II each system currently maintains. This 
descriptive analysis in turn allows for both a better understanding of the potential 
consequences that federal constitutional structure may have for climate change 
negotiations, as well as an indication of which federal systems maintain 
constitutional orders that would require adjustment to strike the difficult balance 
between global climate governance and decentralized forest management.  
II. ELEMENTS OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS THAT BEST BALANCE 
GLOBAL FOREST GOVERNANCE AND DECENTRALIZED FOREST POLICY MAKING 
Though the potential for subnational governments to place constitutional 
constraints on national governments may cause federal systems to present more 
difficulties for international climate negotiations than do unitary systems of 
government, it is a mistake to assume that federal systems uniformly do so. The 
federal systems assessed in Part III below maintain constitutions that vary greatly 
in their allocation of constitutional authority over forest management between the 
national and subnational governments. In fact, certain federal systems maintain 
constitutions that allow their involvement in climate change negotiations to 
approximate the operation of unitary systems of government—at least from a legal 
perspective—and even to facilitate potentially more effective treaty implementation 
than unitary systems as the benefits of decentralized forest management may be 
more readily achieved in federal systems that are already constitutionally 
decentralized.  
To most effectively balance decentralized forest governance in federal systems 
with successful negotiation and implementation of a treaty aimed at forest 
management, however, federal systems must maintain three key elements: (1) 
national constitutional primacy over both national and subnational forest policy, (2) 
national sharing of constitutional authority over forest policy with subnational 
governments, and (3) forest policy institutional enforcement capacity. The 
following description of these three elements provides context for Part III’s survey 
of which federal systems here reviewed currently maintain all or some of these 
elements. Likewise, the survey in Part III will make more clear the meaning and 
implications of each of these elements through the provision of tangible examples.  
A. National Constitutional Primacy over Forest Policy 
When the present needs are especially urgent, and local costs of 
exploitation are not immediately incurred, resources are exploited. 
Achieving positive environmental and social outcomes requires 
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standards and means for ensuring that nationally defined environmental 
and social concerns are taken into account.94 
“National constitutional primacy” is a term this Article introduces to describe 
the attribute of a federal system whereby the national government maintains 
constitutional authority to guide regulatory or management standards for a resource 
that may be the subject of domestic legislation passed pursuant to an international 
treaty—here, forest management included within a climate treaty. National 
constitutional primacy over forest policy is a key element for federal system 
participation in such a treaty for the simple reason that a national government 
ultimately unconstrained by subnational interference in domestic policy can more 
freely arrange its international obligations. To be clear, the introduction of this 
element is not advocating an evisceration of decentralized forest policy.95 Indeed, 
as discussed in Part II.B below, the numerous benefits of decentralized forest 
governance are well documented: reduction of central government bureaucracy 
resulting in more efficient decision making; better access to local knowledge 
leading to increased understanding of local needs and constraints; better 
information flow between local and central governments, as well as between the 
government and private sector; greater local cooperation and stakeholder interest in 
governance participation; and reduction of central government “political meddling” 
and corruption.96 Each of these is a crucial component to effective resource 
governance on local, national, and international scales. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Jesse C. Ribot, Choosing Representation: Institutions and Powers for Decentralized 
Natural Resources Management, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER 
AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 86, 98. 
 95. As a general matter, scholars maintain mixed views on the value of forest policy 
decentralization, and the means by which it occurs, with some arguing  
for slowing the pace [of decentralization] in order to give governments and 
citizens a chance to adapt to the new features of a decentralized approach; 
others suggest that local governments and citizens will become adept at dealing 
with their new powers only by using them. Although [scholars] see the 
potential value of decentralization, some favour a stronger central role and 
others a stronger local role, in the balance of power. Some show more faith in 
communities’ management abilities, some have less.  
Jürgen Blaser, Christian Küchli, Carol J. Pierce Colfer & Doris Capistrano, Introduction, in 
THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 1, 5. 
 96. See Gregersen et al., supra note 8, at 27–28. Other scholars have noted that the 
primary arguments for decentralization are that  
decentralization produces more just and equitable outcomes and that localized 
control is more functional than state control. Put simply, consultation and 
collaboration with social movements and voluntary associations provides an 
effective means of harnessing local knowledge and agency in both plan making 
and implementation. Engaged civic actors can also act as a check on state 
power—thus helping to democratize governance—and offer a counterpoint to 
its limited rationalist worldview.  
Marcus B. Lane, Decentralization or Privatization of Environmental Governance? Forest 
Conflict and Bioregional Assessment in Australia, 19 J. RURAL STUD. 283, 284−85 (2003) 
(emphasis omitted) (citations omitted). These benefits track the noted benefits of federalism 
generally, as summarized by Professor Rosenn: federalism promotes economic growth, 
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Despite these well-recognized, tangible benefits of decentralized local forest 
governance, scholars have noted that, 
while there is a trend toward decentralization of forest governance 
within many countries, there also are developing clear arguments for 
mechanisms, central or even international (e.g. through global 
conventions), to ensure that activities and events that affect more than 
one state and that are involved in the production of national or global 
public goods associated with the environmental services derived from 
forests are being adequately considered by those with the mandate to 
manage them.97 
Indeed, climate change has been perhaps the foremost driver for “clear arguments” 
against “over-decentralization,” as the role of forests in regulating global 
atmospheric carbon has been increasingly recognized over the last twenty years. 
Suddenly the aggregated effects of decentralized, local decision making regarding 
forest resources have taken on global significance, as sequestration of carbon is 
perhaps the most important “environmental service” performed by forests in 
modern times. In short, “[d]ecentralization offers great opportunities for improved 
forest management, but also great challenges. It is far from being a final solution to 
the ills of the forest sector because significant possible disadvantages and dangers 
threaten its potential benefits.”98 National constitutional primacy provides a check 
on these well-recognized disadvantages of decentralized forest governance, which 
include making more difficult the coordination and implementation of national 
policies, undermining national objectives when local objectives are not consistent, 
decision making at local levels that is not socially or environmentally desirable or 
sustainable, loss of noncommercial objectives of national forest policy, and 
pressure to extract forest resources for immediate local benefit to the detriment of 
long term sustainability, to name a few.99  
National governments in federal systems often maintain regulatory 
responsibility for forest resource issues that have effects across subnational 
boundaries or that provide national or international ecosystem services and public 
                                                                                                                 
reciprocity in the enforcement of the law, safeguard against the potential tyranny of 
centralized power, encouragement of local citizen participation in governance, 
experimentation with new forms of governance (“laboratories for experimentation”), and 
administrative efficiency as decentralized governments can specifically tailor laws to fit 
local needs. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in Comparative Perspective, 26 U. 
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 6−7 (1994). 
 97. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 8–9. 
 98. Gregersen et al., supra note 8, at 29. 
 99. See id. at 28. Other noted problems are failure to achieve economies of scale, 
potential increase in arbitrariness and corruption, and the potential for local elites to control 
decentralized institutions. See id. These negatives track the noted pitfalls with federalism 
generally, as summarized by Professor Rosenn—that federalism makes governance of 
problems that transcend subnational boundaries more difficult, creates economic inefficiency 
as overlapping laws conflict, causes a race to the bottom among states competing for 
business and growth, imposes penalties on citizens of neighboring states, creates redundant 
governance, disenfranchises local minorities at the expense of local majorities, and causes 
overall instability. See Rosenn, supra note 96, at 7−8. 
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goods, and “[o]ften, the federal government influences or controls state activity 
through federal laws, incentives and checks and balances related to the use of 
resources.”100 Even so, some federal systems controlling vast forest resources do 
not maintain a constitutional framework for broad national forest policy 
formulation that ensures the benefits of decentralized management are maximized 
in balance with national or global provision of public goods. Pursuing mechanisms 
for addressing this constitutional gap in these systems is important, as the policy 
goals of decentralized forest management may best be achieved if federal systems 
will “[i]dentify which national policies should override the preferences of 
decentralized bodies and establish clear rules for their enforcement at [the] national 
level” and “[e]stablish forest management minimum standards for decentralized 
institutions.”101 In fact, a report issued to the Fourth UNFF by participants of the 
Interlaken decentralization workshop stated as one of the guiding principles of 
effective forest policy decentralization implementation that “[d]ecentralization in 
the forest sector should not be implemented in isolation from a general national 
forestry strategy, such as national forest programmes.”102 
Given the importance of a national government’s ability to spur effective 
decentralized forest governance, what this Article argues best facilitates federal 
nation-state agreement on global forest governance is not direct national control per 
se over forest policy at all levels, but rather national constitutional authority to act 
as a safety net—a function that may be termed “Fail-safe Federalism.”103 In other 
words, “national constitutional primacy” denotes national governments maintaining 
legal authority to guide forest policy—including the ability to enter into 
international climate and forest treaties unconstrained—while leaving subnational 
governments with primary regulatory and management roles.104 To be certain, too 
much national control over forest management can also be detrimental to forest 
governance. Scholars note that “[c]entral governments . . . commonly maintain 
control over forest management through extensive bureaucratic procedures, such as 
forest management plans, price controls, marketing and permits for cutting, 
transport and processing. In some cases this represents a loss of local 
decision-making authority . . . .”105 Rather, the type of national constitutional 
                                                                                                                 
 
 100. Gregersen, supra note 8, at 15. 
 101. Id. at 28−29. 
 102. Doris Capistrano & Carol J. Pierce Colfer, Decentralization: Issues, Lessons and 
Reflections, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra 
note 8, at 296, 311. 
 103. See generally Blake Hudson, Fail-Safe Federalism and Climate Change: The Case 
of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy, 44 CONN. L. REV. 925 (2012). 
 104. This approach would be consistent with principles of dynamic federalism. See supra 
note 38. 
 105. Anne M. Larson, Democratic Decentralization in the Forestry Sector: Lessons 
Learned from Africa, Asia and Latin America, in THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: 
FORESTS, POWER AND PEOPLE, supra note 8, at 32, 36. Some scholars have noted that “[t]he 
role of national government is to ensure that the many micro-level management decisions of 
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state/forest interface.” Craig Segall, Note, The Forestry Crisis as a Crisis of the Rule of Law, 
58 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1549 (2006). 
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primacy that can most effectively balance global governance with the benefits of 
subnational decentralized policy is that which establishes a minimum forest 
management standards framework within which subnational governments may 
operate with discretion,106 and which subnational governments can supplement 
with even higher standards if they so choose. Importantly, as discussed in this 
Article’s conclusion, national constitutional primacy need not flow out of top-
down, prescriptive constitutional mandates at the national level, as it can arise 
bilaterally out of cooperative federalism arrangements or even horizontally out of 
regional agreements among subnational governments.107 
Achieving the appropriate degree of national government oversight is crucial 
because “[a]lthough too much oversight of local governments can be detrimental, 
checks and balances on local authority over forests are essential for good 
governance and to protect resources.”108 Other scholars note that,  
even where secure decentralization has been implemented, support 
from central government and others are needed to ensure that natural 
resources are not over-exploited . . . . Some of these efforts include 
minimum environmental standards . . . . Central government must play 
a key role in advancing reforms needed to achieve effective 
decentralization.109  
Stated differently, “simply devolving power to communities can produce either no 
positive change or even negative change, if devolution reduces the power of the 
national government to stop local resource misuse that might once have been 
limited by national policy.”110  
Ultimately, scholars who are well aware of the value of decentralized forest 
policy recognize that a “minimum standards” approach is “an important role of 
central governments,” because, 
minimum environmental standards are a complementary means of 
codifying . . . principles [of decentralization] in law, thus establishing 
greater local autonomy in natural resources management and use. The 
minimum-standards approach complements decentralization by 
specifying the boundaries to the domain of local autonomy without 
restricting discretion within those boundaries . . . .  
   A minimum environmental standards approach—a set of restrictions 
and guidelines for environmental use and management—would replace 
                                                                                                                 
 
 106. See Larson, supra note 105, at 36. Scholars have noted that “[e]lected forest 
councils in Kumaon, India, have historically operated under such an arrangement. They have 
an important autonomous decision-making space within rules and limits established by the 
central government . . . . The upward, as well as downward, accountability of the councils 
has been important to their success.” Id. 
 107. See Hudson, supra note 38. 
 108. Larson, supra note 105, at 43.  
 109. Ribot, supra note 94, at 89–90. 
 110. Segall, supra note 105, at 1556. 
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the centrally directed micromanagement approach currently exercised 
through elaborate plans and planning processes.111 
The type of Fail-safe Federalism facilitated by national constitutional primacy 
strikes a balance between centralized planning and minimum standards at the 
federal level and decentralized implementation, harnessing of local information and 
expertise, and other benefits at the subnational level. 
Despite the importance of Fail-safe Federalism and minimum national 
standards, national government involvement in federal system decentralized forest 
policy cannot be divined from thin air. If a federal constitution does not permit 
national constitutional primacy over forest policy at all levels (as is arguably the 
case in the United States where the national government only maintains primacy 
over 35% of forests) then the benefits of decentralized management may not be 
balanced with the provision of national environmental goods and other goals—at 
the very least there will be no legal mechanism for ensuring that they are. Equally 
important, protection of global goods provided by forests, such as climate change 
regulation via forest carbon sequestration, may not be facilitated by an international 
treaty because key federal systems may refuse to participate based upon domestic 
constitutional concerns. Thus, national constitutional primacy provides a legal 
mechanism that facilitates the benefits of both decentralized management and 
responsible centralized forest planning in a way that is realized not only by the 
individual nation, but by the international community engaged in creating effective 
solutions to global environmental problems such as climate change.112  
B. National Sharing of Constitutional Forest Authority 
National sharing of constitutional forest authority can be summarized simply as 
a national government maintaining constitutional primacy over forest policy at both 
national and subnational levels, while at the same time voluntarily and 
cooperatively sharing that authority with subnational governments to achieve the 
most effective management on localized scales. It is, in effect, the other side of the 
“national constitutional primacy” coin—a federal system cannot maintain this 
element unless it first maintains national constitutional primacy over forest 
management. A federal system may, on the other hand, maintain national 
constitutional primacy and choose to “overcentralize” national forest policy by 
refusing to share that authority with subnational governments in a way that is 
consistent with theories of dynamic federalism.113 From a treaty negotiation 
standpoint, having legal authority to implement domestic policy allows a national 
government to enter into an international agreement unconstrained, while its 
willingness to share decentralized forest management responsibilities facilitates 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. Ribot, supra note 94, at 98. 
 112. Centralized forest planning not only facilitates international agreement, but also 
provides consistent policy across subnational borders and the prevention of a “race to the 
bottom” or “tragedy of the commons” in subnational forest policy. Blake Hudson, 
Commerce in the Commons: A Unified Theory of Natural Capital Regulation Under the 
Commerce Clause, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 375 (2011). 
 113. See supra note 38. 
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more effective domestic implementation of the agreement. Even outside the context 
of an international agreement, this element also aligns the benefits of sustainable 
decentralized forest policy with the provision of global goods and services, since 
the national government is more likely to value a wider range of forest goods and 
services than do individual subnational governments. Ultimately, this sharing of 
authority is crucial, as a condition of good decentralized forest governance is 
“[e]ffective and balanced distribution of forest related responsibilities and authority 
among levels of government” and “[c]ertain forest management decisions are better 
made at the subnational, or even local levels of government, while others may best 
be retained at a central level.”114 In other words, this element allows the national 
government to act as the aforementioned fail-safe via a “minimum standards” 
approach without giving rise to the myriad of problems caused by a national 
government that micromanages policy decisions on local scales. 
As noted above, suitable responsibilities to be maintained by the national 
government include providing coherent forest management on issues that may have 
spillover effects across political and geographic boundaries of subnational units and 
the provision of national and even international goods and services. There is a need 
for “strong central government guidance and overall leadership,” and 
“[d]ecentralized forest management does not mean less need for a strong central 
government.”115 Nonetheless, in order to preserve the resource management gains 
made during the global shift toward decentralized forest policy, it is important that 
even in the presence of constitutional authority to do so, national governments in 
federal systems do not overcentralize in a way that usurps forest policy decisions 
best left to subnational governments.  
Ultimately, national governments that are limited in their ability to implement a 
treaty effectively on domestic scales will be less inclined to enter into an 
international agreement—rendering national constitutional primacy of great 
importance. National sharing of constitutional forest authority, however, achieves 
the crucial balance of ensuring that international obligations to which the national 
government can unilaterally agree are domestically carried out in the most effective 
manner possible and in a way that is most consistent with the federal form of 
governance chosen by many nations controlling crucial forest resources.  
C. Institutional Enforcement Capacity 
Scholars have noted that “forest governance is strongly dependent on the 
institutional and political conditions of the government in general”116 and that 
“[c]losing the gap between law and on-ground outcomes is one of the main 
challenges in the forest sector . . . so issues of enforcement and compliance are 
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http://www.cifor.cgiar.org/publications/pdf_files/Books/BContreras-Hermosilla0701.pdf.  
 116. CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17, at 4. 
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amongst the most important arenas of policy analysis.”117 Indeed, institutional 
enforcement capacity118 is a crucial element for federal-system treaty agreement 
and implementation for another obvious reason—without the ability to adequately 
enforce domestic policy, international obligations cannot be met, and, therefore, 
national governments will be less likely to agree to obligations in the first instance. 
It is true that “[r]elationships between the central and sub-national governments are 
never constant in a country and changes are to be expected in a democratic country 
with a federal system of government.”119 Yet these political shifts in ability or 
willingness to implement national policies are distinct from having a constitutional, 
legal capacity to do so.  
As seen below, federal systems without adequate institutional enforcement 
capacity over forest management are hampered by unclear constitutional divisions 
of power between national and subnational governments, and between branches of 
the national government, and are further subject to corruption and other 
institutional maladies—resulting in direct, negative effects on international 
negotiations. A thorough assessment of institutional environmental enforcement 
problems is beyond the scope of this Article, and is otherwise thoroughly 
documented in the literature. It is important, however, to introduce this element 
here since, unfortunately, certain federal systems analyzed below maintain the first 
two key constitutional elements for facilitating climate treaty agreement and 
implementation but lack institutional enforcement capacity. 
Part III now undertakes a comparative constitutional assessment of different 
federal systems that control important forest resources to analyze which systems 
maintain the key elements presented thus far.  
III. IMPACTS OF SELECT FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL FOREST AND 
CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS: SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND FOREST 
OWNERSHIP 
As noted in Figure 1, above, federal nations controlling important forest 
resources enter international climate negotiations from widely divergent 
positions—both with regard to the division of constitutional authority over forest 
policy, as well as to the public-private allocation of forest ownership. Some federal 
constitutions place constitutional regulatory authority over all of a nation’s forests 
in the hands of the national government, which presents fewer difficulties for 
global climate change governance as national governments can act without 
constitutional constraints during international negotiations. Other federal 
constitutions can be interpreted as authorizing virtually exclusive subnational 
government regulation of a vast majority of the nation’s forests, effectively 
prohibiting a prescriptive regulatory role for the national government in setting 
management standards. While this approach limits the national government’s 
ability to bind the nation to a treaty aimed at forests, it may better facilitate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 21. 
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sustainable decentralized forest governance since it provides legal protection from 
the disadvantages of overcentralization. In addition, private forests make up a 
majority of the forested land in some federal systems, with private forest 
management subject to exclusive subnational constitutional control; while in other 
systems, private and even subnationally owned forests may be subject to national 
regulatory authority. Various other federal systems fall somewhere in between 
these extremes of constitutional authority and forest ownership.  
The following review describes which federal systems come from which 
divergent position in order to gain insight into the impacts those systems’ domestic 
constitutional structures have on international climate negotiations. The review 
suggests that the federal systems here assessed; Australia, Brazil, Canada, India, 
and Russia—along with the United States via comparative analysis—can 
effectively be placed into three categories (Chart 1 below), based upon their 
retention of certain key elements discussed in Part II. Nations with all three 
elements provide models of federal systems that are most capable of engaging in 
global forest governance balanced with the realities of domestic federalism and the 
protection of local forest goods and services. 
A. Australia 
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement 
The Australian Constitution provides no explicit environmental regulatory 
authority to either the national (or “Commonwealth”) government or the states and 
territories.120 As such—similarly to the United States—general authority to protect 
the environment is vested in the states,121 and state and territory governments 
generally maintain constitutional authority to establish the legal and policy 
framework under which both public and private forests are managed.122 A 
governance structure where subnational governments maintain primacy over 
domestic forest policy might be expected, as in the United States, to result in a 
domestic legal roadblock to the formation and implementation of an international 
treaty aimed at forest management activities.  
Unlike the United States, however, the Australian High Court has definitively 
ruled that the Australian national government can gain regulatory authority over 
any subject matter if such regulation is based upon an international treaty, even if in 
an area of traditional state constitutional authority—a very different outcome than 
the much narrower result of Holland.123 The Australian High Court, in 
                                                                                                                 
 
 120. JAMES RASBAND, JAMES SALZMAN & MARK SQUILLACE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 
AND POLICY 171 (2d ed. 2009).  
 121. Id. at 172.  
 122. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT: A NEW FOCUS 
FOR AUSTRALIA’S FORESTS 1 (1995), available at http://www.daff.gov.au/__data/assets/ 
pdf_file/0019/37612/nat_nfps.pdf; see also Ferguson & Chandrasekharan, supra note 16, at 
75 (stating that “[u]nder Australia’s constitution, administration of all matters of land 
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 123. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the Australian Constitution is silent regarding whether 
the federal and state governments have shared, or whether either has exclusive, authority to 
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Commonwealth v. Tasmania,124 “confirmed the Commonwealth’s authority to 
intervene in the management of natural resources in order to meet its international 
obligations” and “reinforced an earlier High Court decision . . . which set the 
Commonwealth’s international obligations above state’s rights.”125 The 
constitutional power upon which the Tasmania decision was based is Section 51 of 
the Australian Constitution, the “external affairs” power, which grants the 
Commonwealth government the authority to pass laws governing “external 
affairs.”126 As a result, the Australian national government can now “legislate 
comprehensively in respect of state properties in reliance on an international 
treaty,”127 and “Parliament does not lack power to implement treaties to which 
Australia is or intends to become a party, whatever the subject matter.”128 
Regarding Tasmania and related cases, scholars have argued that,  
[o]ver time, the legal and political implications of these decisions 
became clear: environmental policy was a jurisdiction shared by both 
the states and the Commonwealth. In time, this led to increased 
institutional experimentation at the national level to cope with the 
‘forestry question’ (sic). A variety of new land management 
arrangements emerged, including new policies and structures of 
management.129 
Ultimately, the Australian High Court’s jurisprudence firmly establishes that the 
Australian national government, when acting pursuant to an international treaty, 
has constitutional primacy over decentralized forest policy (element 1).130 
As a result, even though subnational governments maintain primary 
constitutional authority for regulating forests in Australia, the Commonwealth and 
its agencies have exercised increasing influence over forest governance in the 
                                                                                                                 
negotiate and implement treaties. See Brian R. Opeskin & Donald R. Rothwell, The Impact 
of Treaties on Australian Federalism, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (1995). For a 
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Treaty Solutions from the Land Down Under: Reconciling American Federalism and 
International Law, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 115, 125 (2005); Julia Yoo, Note, 
Participation in the Making of Legislative Treaties: The United States and Other Federal 
Systems, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455, 487 (2003).  
 124. (1983) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.). 
 125. Marcus B. Lane, Regional Forest Agreements: Resolving Resource Conflicts or 
Managing Resource Politics?, 37 AUSTL. GEOGRAPHICAL STUD. 142, 144 (1999) (citing 
Koowarta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) 153 CLR 168 (Austl.)). 
 126. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51 (xxix). 
 127. Opeskin & Rothwell, supra note 123, at 31.  
 128. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).  
 129. Lane, supra note 96, at 287 (citation omitted). Also noting that the High Court has 
consistently upheld Commonwealth involvement in forest policy as “in keeping with its 
constitutional powers for trade and foreign affairs.” Id. 
 130. Scholars have argued that “[t]he U.S. legal environment is substantially different 
from that in Australia. While the Australian High Court has consistently favored the federal 
government’s ability to make and implement treaties, the [U.S.] Supreme Court has applied 
limits to the U.S. federal government’s power in a variety of areas . . . .” Emery, supra note 
123, at 151. 
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states,131 and “the politics of federalism” have had “an important impact on forest 
policy.”132 Indeed, forest conflicts in Australia have been “at the forefront of 
altering the character of federal relations in Australia.”133 Commonwealth v. 
Tasmania and related cases involving federal intervention in areas of traditional 
state sovereignty134 have “had a profound impact on the distribution of power 
within the Australian federation” and have “substantial implications for Australian 
federalism,”135 as they establish “an expansive view of the Commonwealth’s power 
to implement treaties to which Australia is a party by enacting appropriate domestic 
legislation.”136 Consequently, the Australian government is “constitutionally and 
legally empowered to act on environmental matters”137 and is “increasingly 
politically obliged to involve itself in contentious matters of natural resource 
policy,”138 especially since “an expectation was created within the environmental 
movement that it could now appeal to the Commonwealth against any state 
decision.”139 In other words, 
the nature of Australian federalism has been fundamentally altered. 
Whereas it had long been assumed that natural resource policy was a 
state jurisdiction and that the Australian government had a co-
ordinating function in which each level of government had distinct 
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 137. Lane, supra note 125, at 145. Australia’s 1995 National Forest Policy Statement 
acknowledges this federal authority, citing international agreements and acts of Parliament 
requiring federal government involvement in land use decision-making regarding forests. 
See NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 19−20. 
 138. Lane, supra note 125, at 145 (citation omitted); see also NATIONAL FOREST POLICY 
STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 19−20; Lane, supra note 96, at 287.  
 139. Lane, supra note 125, at 144.  
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jurisdictions, it was now clear that the states shared resource policy 
with the Commonwealth in a concurrent federation.140 
Take, for example, the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
(Conservation Act),141 passed by the Australian national government in 1999 in 
order to “allow Australian Government involvement in environmental matters,” 
and particularly management of native forests.142 Because the Conservation Act 
invokes powers constitutionally reserved for the states, some of its sections are not 
applied in the presence of political agreements between the federal and state 
governments.143 The Conservation Act, however, is just one component of an 
increasing trend of federal involvement in forest matters, as “[s]everal national 
issues, including climate change, environmental heritage, water conservation and 
the protection of endangered species, have become more important since the 
implementation of the National Forest Policy Statement of 1992,” and “[s]everal 
stakeholders are interested in having increased Australian Government intervention 
to coordinate a strategy to address the national issues that are independent” of 
political agreements between the federal and state governments (that is, cooperative 
federalism).144  
Importantly, however, the Conservation Act has implications for both sides of 
the “national constitutional primacy” coin—though the Australian national 
government maintains constitutional primacy in the presence of an international 
treaty, the Conservation Act also demonstrates the Commonwealth government’s 
commitment to sharing constitutional forest policy authority (element 2). In other 
words, the Australian national government has been quite vigorous in establishing 
principles of cooperative federalism whereby it retains the authority to intervene in 
state management of forests under its “external affairs” power, but leaves primary 
forest governance in the hands of the subnational governments for political and 
management reasons.  
This approach is perhaps best evidenced by Australia’s 1992 
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment (Inter-Governmental 
Agreement),145 which “sought to reduce intergovernmental conflict by committing 
all governments to an agreement about their respective roles with respect to 
environmental issues.”146 Under the Inter-Governmental Agreement, the 
Commonwealth voluntarily limited its role in resource policy to specific 
circumstances, including “[r]epresenting the national interest”147 in circumstances 
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 141. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999, (Cth) (Austl.). 
 142. Kah Low & Sinniah Mahendrarajah, Future Directions for the Australian Forest 
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“where the regional implications of proposals for the use of a resource transcend 
State boundaries and affect two or more jurisdictions . . . where there are relevant 
responsibilities under Commonwealth Acts of Parliament such as the Environment 
Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act [of] 1974,” and “where, in the light of 
scientific evidence, the Commonwealth has obligations under international 
conventions.”148 The Inter-Governmental Agreement is a political concession rather 
than a legal obligation, whereby the national government ceded part of its authority 
to the states by placing self-imposed restrictions on its power to regulate the 
environment.149 Though the government may have politically ceded this authority, 
it did not do so constitutionally, as the High Court’s rulings in Tasmania and 
related cases are dispositive on the question of constitutional authority. In other 
words, “the Commonwealth has, regardless of its legal and constitutional powers 
and capabilities, defined for itself a role narrower than its legal responsibilities,”150 
and has “generally approached its relationship with the states in a spirit of 
cooperative federalism [and] self-imposed restraint in exercising its constitutional 
powers.”151  
Similar to the Inter-Governmental Agreement, the Commonwealth and the states 
have entered into agreement on the 1992 National Forest Policy Statement (Forest 
Statement),152 which established broad-based goals for Australia’s native forests, 
including to “maintain an extensive and permanent native forest estate in Australia 
and to manage that estate in an ecologically sustainable manner so as to conserve 
the suite of values that forests can provide for current and future generations.”153 
The Forest Statement was also meant to establish a framework for cooperation 
between the federal and state governments on forest management and was “devised 
to give expression to the [Inter-Governmental Agreement] in terms of devolving 
policy control for resource management issues to the states.”154 The Forest 
Statement establishes that,  
State and Territory governments have primary responsibility for forest 
management, in recognition of the constitutional responsibility of the 
States for land use decisions and their ownership of large areas of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 148. NATIONAL FOREST POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 122, at 19–20. 
 149. The Commonwealth’s role in resource management is “restricted” to “[r]epresenting 
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forest. The States and Territories have enacted legislation that allocates 
forest land tenures and specifies the administrative framework and 
policies within which public and private forests are managed. Local 
governments have responsibilities for local land use planning and rating 
systems, which affect public and private forest management and use.155 
Under the Forest Statement, the national government, while maintaining no explicit 
constitutional authority over forest policy except that relating to nationally owned 
forests, is primarily responsible for “coordinating a national approach to both 
environmental and industry-development issues . . . including a national approach 
to forest issues”156—a recognition of the Commonwealth’s implicit constitutional 
authority to order its international obligations under its “external affairs” power.  
Other examples of the Commonwealth’s sharing of national constitutional 
primacy are the Regional Forest Agreements (RFAs) negotiated between the 
national and state governments. RFAs constitute an attempt to navigate the politics 
of the national government having potentially unfettered regulatory authority over 
environmental resources and private property rights under its “external affairs” 
power. RFAs are twenty-year plans meant to guide the management of forests, to 
establish “long-term, durable agreement on the use of forests in order to provide 
industry with access to forest resources while protecting the environmental and 
cultural values of forest areas,”157 and to “mediat[e] the tension between different 
levels of Government.”158 Because “Commonwealth governments of all political 
persuasions have felt the electoral and policy impact of conflict with the states on 
environmental matters . . . [t]he RFA process [provides] a means of establishing a 
long-term resolution to questions of forest allocation and use in a way that reasserts 
the primacy of the states in forest management.”159  
RFAs effectively constitute a political maneuver on behalf of the national 
government as a means of navigating “forest politics” in Australia by establishing 
shared authority with subnational governments in the area of forest management. 
Indeed, “[t]he political purpose of the RFA process . . . was to take forest issues off 
the political agenda by securing Commonwealth and State cooperation.”160 As a 
result, RFAs also encapsulate both national constitutional primacy and national 
sharing of forest authority. With regard to primacy, RFAs allow the 
Commonwealth to directly participate in forest planning to take into account 
biodiversity, water production, wood production, and social and economic values. 
As a result, “the long-standing argument that forestry is a State responsibility under 
the Constitution has been superseded by these arrangements.”161 Yet RFAs also 
represent a voluntary ceding of regulatory authority from the national government 
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to the states, given that “RFAs have surrendered much of the [forest regulatory] 
powers to the states.”162 
In sum, the Australian model of federalism, specifically in the context of climate 
change and forests, may be summarized as follows: 
 One response during the past ten years to the expanded scope of the 
Commonwealth Parliament’s power over external affairs has been to 
adopt a more cooperative approach to federalism in Australia. Through 
this process, the states have had a greater policy input into decisions 
concerning Australia’s treaty relations, and an expanded role in the 
domestic implementation and enforcement of the obligations imposed 
by those treaties. This approach has generally been a successful one 
provided there has been a clear division of responsibility between 
Commonwealth and states over the relevant subject matter and the 
Commonwealth has been able to gain the cooperation of the states in 
creating a cooperative legislative scheme.163 
Ultimately, Australia maintains all three elements conducive to maximizing 
flexibility in international negotiations among federal systems of government, 
while also retaining the benefits of decentralized forest governance. National 
constitutional primacy allows the Australian national government to enter into an 
international treaty on climate and forests unconstrained and to act as a fail-safe in 
the absence of sound subnational forest policy. National sharing of constitutional 
authority facilitates mechanisms that allow subnational governments to both 
successfully implement the treaty and perform their functional role within a federal 
system to achieve the benefits of decentralized forest management. Institutional 
enforcement capacity in Australia allows the treaty and implementing legislation to 
be enforced.164  
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2. Public/Private Forest Ownership 
Approximately 74% of Australian forests are publicly owned and 26% are 
privately owned.165 As noted, Australian state and territory governments have 
primary responsibility for regulating both public and private forests, though both 
are also subject to federal regulation under the Commonwealth’s “external affairs” 
power in the presence of an international treaty. Since the “external affairs” power 
received expanded interpretation in Tasmania, the national government has taken 
an even greater role in private forest management. The Forest Statement includes as 
one of its goals the sustainable management of privately owned forests, which is to 
be undertaken “through a combination of measures that may include dissemination 
of information about and technical support for forest management, education 
programs, conservation incentives, land-clearing controls, harvesting controls, and 
codes of forest practice.”166  
Due to the high proportion of publicly owned forests, “[f]orest and timber 
resources on private lands . . . have largely escaped public scrutiny and regulation” 
and “[t]he practice and profession of forestry is primarily focused on public 
lands.”167 Even so, due to both the high proportion of public forest ownership, and 
the fact that both public and private forests are subject to Commonwealth exercises 
of its “external affairs” power, the Australian national government maintains the 
constitutional capacity to prevent its limited private ownership of forests from 
derailing its involvement in international negotiations on forests—in stark contrast 
to the United States, where the treaty power may not trump subnational regulatory 
control over the 60% of forests in private ownership. What this ultimately means is 
that the division of forest ownership between private and public entities does not 
legally impact the ability of the national government to agree to and implement a 
climate treaty, because it is not legally constrained by either subnational units of 
government or private property interests in the exercise of its “external affairs” 
power. 
B. Brazil 
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement 
Prior to the 1988 Brazilian Constitution, which aimed to decentralize forest 
management, Brazilian forest policy at all levels was administered exclusively by 
the national government.168 The national government exercised this authority under 
the first major forest law in Brazil, the Forest Code of 1965,169 which provided the 
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general framework for forest laws, established protected forest areas and the 
process for designating them, and put into place “detailed forest practice guidelines 
for protected areas and reserves on all forestland in the country.”170 The 
constitutional authority for managing forests, however, was reallocated in 1988 
with the establishment of a new Brazilian constitution.  
Unlike the U.S. and Australian constitutions, the Brazilian Constitution contains 
explicit forestry provisions. Article 225 states that the Brazilian forests are “part of 
the national patrimony, and they shall be used, as provided by law, under 
conditions which ensure the preservation of the environment.”171 Article 23 
declares that the national, state, and local governments have the power to “preserve 
the forests,” while Article 24 establishes that they may do so with concurrent 
legislative competence in the area of forest management. Regarding concurrent 
legislation, Article 24 supposedly limits the national government’s role to the 
“establishment of general principles,” and preserves the “supplementary 
competence of the states” to legislate.172 Article 24 declares, however, that “[t]he 
supervenience of a federal law over general rules suspends the effectiveness of a 
state law to the extent that the two are contrary.”173  
The “supervenience” element of the Brazilian Constitution has proven crucial to 
defining the true division of forest regulatory authority between the Brazilian 
national and subnational governments. Scholars interpret the “concurrent 
legislation” clause in Article 23 to mean that “the federal government has absolute 
power (plenary power) to establish laws and regulations, and the states and 
municipalities have only limited power.”174 Indeed, forest policy in Brazil might be 
characterized as completely “supervened” by the national government. The primary 
national agency responsible for implementing and enforcing forest laws, the 
Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources 
(IBAMA), is said to have adopted the pre-1988 Constitution “centralized 
administration model” of governance, despite the fact that the 1988 Constitution 
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was designed to facilitate general decentralization of governance.175 IBAMA had 
traditionally regulated all public and private lands, and though new laws have 
sought to transfer some of that authority to subnational governments,176 IBAMA 
still retains superseding authority over forest resources.177 In fact, state and local 
governments have largely “taken very little or no responsibility for the 
implementation of forest policy, including enforcement.”178  
Due in part to general principles of constitutional interpretation by the Brazilian 
judiciary, the 1988 Constitution’s legal framework for transitioning to a more 
decentralized form of forest management has not been very successful. The 
Brazilian high court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (Supremo Tribunal), has 
affirmed Brazil’s commitment to a more centralized form of federalism than that 
present in the United States. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supremo Tribunal 
has never invalidated federal legislation for intruding into traditional “reserved” 
powers of the states, nor has the Supremo Tribunal debated whether its decisions 
should be governed by federal or state law.179 The Supremo Tribunal’s more 
centralized view of federalism results from the fact that “Brazilian Constitutions 
have granted far greater powers to the federal government than the U.S. 
Constitution.”180 As a result, Supremo Tribunal justices have never “assumed the 
role of protecting states’ rights from infringement by the federal legislation.”181 
Ultimately, even though there is constitutional concurrence between the national 
and subnational governments for forest legislation in Brazil—establishing the legal 
framework for decentralized forest governance—the national government’s power 
to “supervene” subnational authority gives it national constitutional primacy 
(element 1) over forest management. Recently, however, the Brazilian government 
has attempted to remedy the problem of subnational governments not capitalizing 
on their constitutional authority to establish forest policy. New laws aim to transfer 
the approval and enforcement of forest management plans to state environmental 
agencies, and both the national and state governments have shown an increased 
focus on greater subnational involvement in forest regulation.182 Given explicit 
constitutional concurrence over forest policy, and an increased focus on 
decentralized forest governance, Brazil does maintain a national sharing of 
constitutional forest policy authority (element 2)—though it has proven slow to 
come to fruition and the national government “retains much of its traditional 
command and controls regulatory powers.”183 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 19. 
 176. See Bauch et al., supra note 170, at 135. For example, IBAMA previously required 
all forest owners to have an approved forest management plan (Plande Manejo Florestal 
Sustentavel [PMFS]) before harvesting timber, and all harvested timber was required to have 
a transport authorization to demonstrate that it came from an area with an approved forest 
management plan. Id. 
 177. See HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 20. 
 178. Id. (citation omitted). 
 179. Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in Brazil, 43 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 584−85 (2005). 
 180. Id. at 585. 
 181. Id.  
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 183. Bauch et al., supra note 170, at 135. 
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Despite a high concentration of national government legal authority over forests 
and the fact that Brazil has some of the most complex forestry laws in the world, 
Brazil’s forest management constitutional provisions have been largely 
ineffective.184 Thus, even though Brazil maintains the first two elements facilitating 
flexibility in global climate negotiations related to forests, lack of institutional 
enforcement capacity (element 3) has severely impeded actual implementation of 
environmental constitutional provisions and legislation in Brazil.185 Scholars argue 
that “[t]he ineffectiveness of laws alone to protect the environment is nowhere as 
evident as in the contemporary destruction of the Amazonian . . . forests,”186 and 
that “[a]ttempts to embody environmental protection clauses in national 
constitutions, such as Brazil’s, do not appear to have appreciably influenced the 
prevailing bureaucratic culture.”187 Article 26 of the Brazilian Constitution actually 
makes destruction of the Amazonian and Atlantic forests a crime under the penal 
code,188 but rarely has this constitutional provision been enforced.189 The Brazilian 
government’s own reports demonstrate that “the federal government has failed to 
enforce forestry regulations in relation to forest management, indicating widespread 
failure to implement forestry laws.”190 In 1996, Brazilian government audits found 
the compliance rate with forest laws to be just 30%, and that “even among the 30% 
of projects which appeared to fully comply with forest management laws, the 
management plans were not designed as a tool to produce sustainable timber, but 
rather as a means to satisfy legal requirements to procure logging permits.”191 
The lack of enforcement results largely from prosecutorial inaction, a 
conservative judicial system, public apathy, general corruption, deficient legal 
structures, severe budgetary constraints on local governments,192 faulty land 
ownership structures, mistrust of government,193 and other institutional 
problems.194 Thus, in Brazil, even in the presence of explicit forest-protection 
                                                                                                                 
 
 184. Id. at 134. 
 185. See Kellman, supra note 174, at 159. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 
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mandates in the national constitution, the national government is unable to enforce 
legislation under its broad powers. Without a strong judiciary, financial resources, a 
culture of enforcement and overall political will, the central government is impeded 
from guiding forest policy through international mechanisms—though it certainly 
maintains the constitutional authority to do so. Indeed, “Brazilian environmental 
agencies, while varying widely in their capacities, have not lived up to the promise 
of Brazilian environmental law. . . . The result is a profound disconnect between 
environmental law ‘on the books’ and environmental law as it operates in 
practice.”195 Others assert that “[o]n paper, constitutional rights are better protected 
in Brazil than in virtually any other country,”196 but that “[t]he problem is in the 
                                                                                                                 
Scholars have noted that  
[e]nvironmentalists had hoped that the Constitution would mark a great 
advance for environmental protection in Brazil by making environmental 
concerns a national priority, at least on paper. The Brazilian Constitution 
attempts to provide a comprehensive approach to environmental protection. 
Perhaps most importantly, at least rhetorically, is its guarantee of a healthy and 
stable environment to all Brazilian citizens. The truth, however, is that the 
‘promise of the amendments’ contained in the Constitution has been ‘illusory.’  
Kellman, supra note 174, at 152 (citing Armin Rosenkranz et al., Rio Plus Five: 
Environmental Protection and Free Trade in Latin America, 9 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 
527, 567 (1997)). A report issued by the Brazilian Institute of Agriculture Research 
demonstrated that the federal government has failed to enforce forest management 
regulations, and has thus failed to implement forestry laws. HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 2. 
The federal government itself, in 1996, recognized that it had not adequately implemented 
forest management laws. Id. at 29. Government audits in Brazil in 1996 found the 
compliance rate with forest laws to be just 30%. Id. at 78. Compare this with a 96% rate of 
compliance among Finnish timber interests in 1997. Id. Some scholars believe that the lack 
of enforcement is caused “more by lack of human and financial resources and institutional 
capacity than by lack of adequate legislation.” Lila Katz de Barrera-Hernandez & Alastair R. 
Lucas, Environmental Law in Latin America and the Caribbean: Overview and Assessment, 
12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 207, 231 (1999). It has also been noted that in Brazil, “it is 
implementation, rather than policy, that is the problem. . . . [L]ow compliance with existing 
forest management laws, rather than lack of laws, is often a leading cause of unsustainable 
forestry practices.” HIRAKURI, supra note 168, at 2. Yet other scholars have argued that 
“Brazilian environmental agencies tend to be among the least powerful agencies in the 
government. They have difficulty defending policies and administrative actions that run 
contrary to the priorities of political leaders and other governmental agencies.” LESLEY K. 
MCALLISTER, MAKING LAW MATTER: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND LEGAL 
INSTITUTIONS IN BRAZIL 41 (2008).  
 195. MCALLISTER, supra note 194, at 55−56. As a further example, scholars have noted 
that Provisional Measure No. 1511, passed in July 1996 in order to increase forest reserves 
and restrict clear-cutting, “impose[s] stricter requirements on paper, [but] are not routinely 
enforced and represent merely temporary measures rather than long-standing environmental 
change.” Kellman, supra note 174, at 156. For further discussion on how judicial 
deficiencies, lack of education and training for the citizenry, financial, and other societal 
constraints hamstring enforcement of environmental laws in Brazil, see id. at 160−64.  
 196. Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments Under the 1988 
Constitution, 7 SW J. L. & TRADE AM. 291, 318 (2000). 
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disturbing distance that separates the rights inscribed on paper from their effective 
exercise, and above all in the guaranty of their exercise in practical life.”197  
 Though Brazil retains two key elements conducive to balancing global forest 
governance with federal decentralized domestic forest policy—national 
constitutional primacy and national sharing of constitutional authority—lack of 
institutional enforcement capacity prevents Brazil from being fully capable of 
effective forest policy at either end of the local-global forest governance spectrum. 
As noted by one scholar, “[t]he case of Brazil . . . highlights the difficulty in 
designing internationally-binding legal instruments to promote sustainable uses of 
the earth’s resources, and effective enforcement of regulations.”198 
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership 
Roughly 25% of Brazil’s forests are in public ownership. The remaining 75% 
are privately owned, or otherwise “unallocated.”199 Article 44 of the Forest Code of 
the Unified Environmental Law in Brazil requires public and private property 
owners to leave intact 80% of Amazonian rainforest areas.200 These efforts, 
however, have been largely unsuccessful at addressing private forest destruction. 
Though the national government has the constitutional authority to avoid the issues 
faced by the United States in implementing federal policy on private and 
state-owned lands, entrenched and “archaic” views of private property rights in 
Brazil still affect the ability of the national government to enforce forest regulation. 
As noted by one scholar,  
[i]ntervention of public authorities in what goes on inside a legally 
titled property is opposed by the elites who control very large 
properties, and by others who aspire to someday have them. Even 
though the Constitution links the right to private property to its ‘social 
function,’ this linkage has remained vague in legal terms and unapplied 
to destruction of vast areas within the private domain of individuals or 
corporations.201 
Thus, the high proportion of private forest ownership, as in the United States, 
affects implementation of forest policy at the national level—it does so, however, 
due to lack of enforcement, not due to lack of recognized constitutional authority as 
in the United States. Ultimately, because the national government in Brazil 
maintains the constitutional authority to regulate both private and public forests, the 
division of forest ownership between private and public entities does not legally 
constrain the national government in international climate negotiations.  
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C. Canada 
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement 
Like the Brazilian Constitution—and unlike the U.S. and Australian 
Constitutions—the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 explicitly addresses forest 
management. Section 92A designates that the exclusive responsibility for 
nonfederally owned forest legislation, regulation, conservation, and overall 
management lies with the provincial governments. This explicit grant of authority 
to subnational governments has significant implications for Canada’s ability to 
negotiate any climate treaty prescribing forest management standards, since 84% of 
forests are nonfederally owned.202 In addition, the Canadian Constitution, unlike 
other federal systems here discussed, does not allow concurrent jurisdiction over 
forests and declares powers either exclusively federal or exclusively provincial.203 
Section 92(13) of the Constitution Act of 1982 reinforces provincial authority over 
subnational forest management by giving provinces exclusive control over property 
rights,204 which Canadian courts have construed broadly to include land use and 
natural resources management.205 The 1982 amendments to Canada’s constitution 
place it “beyond dispute that the provinces are primarily responsible for forest 
management.”206 The result of these explicit constitutional provisions is that 
Canadian forest policy is “extremely decentralized,” with national authority over 
forests being “particularly weak.”207 The national government itself has even stated 
that “[f]orest management is a matter of provincial jurisdiction. Each province and 
territory has its own set of legislation, policies and regulations to govern the 
management of its forests.”208 As a result, the Canadian national government has 
refused to apply national environmental laws and forest policies or international 
forest management agreements to the provinces.209  
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. See CANADIAN COUNSEL OF FOREST MINISTERS, SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT 
IN CANADA 4 (2010), available at http://www.sfmcanada.org/english/pdf/SFMBooklet_E_ 
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 203. Paul Stanton Kibel, Canada’s International Forest Protection Obligations: A Case 
of Promises Forgotten in British Columbia and Alberta, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 231, 247 
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Section 91 of the Constitution, on the other hand, grants the national 
government exclusive authority over trade and commerce and over “peace, order 
and good government,” which the Canadian Supreme Court construes as including 
implementation of treaties concerning trade and commerce and other matters of 
“national concern.”210 Though the national government could perhaps attempt to 
invoke this constitutional power to justify implementation of international climate 
and forest agreements, “[t]he Canadian federal government has so far adopted the 
position that, under the Canadian Constitution, its hands are tied.”211 Indeed, the 
nearly exclusive control over forest management by the provinces has in the past 
contributed to Canada’s lack of formal participation in international agreements212 
and has resulted in “constant tensions between the provinces and the federal 
government over sharing of power” over forests.213 In other areas of resource 
management, such as fisheries and agriculture, the federal and provincial 
governments have resolved management conflicts with a type of “cooperative 
federalism,” which, though not involving a “national sharing of constitutional 
authority” per se (element 2), involved political and fiscal pressures on the part of 
the national government to achieve provincial compliance with national policy214—
an approach that might better be called “uncooperative federalism.” However, this 
approach has yet to manifest regarding forests, almost certainly due to the explicit 
constitutional provisions vesting exclusive forest management authority in the 
provinces. Consequently, though scholars have argued that the potential exists for 
greater federal involvement in forest policy, the Canadian national government, like 
the U.S. national government, has refused to attempt to extend its authority to 
non-federal forests.215 
This lack of national constitutional primacy (element 1) negatively affects the 
interplay between Canadian federalism and international agreements concerning 
forests, and the Canadian national government is restrained by 
provincially-reserved powers in the exercise of its treaty power.216 In other words, 
“in Canada, the federal government lacks legislative competence to implement 
treaties whose subject matter falls within provincial jurisdiction”217—a scenario 
similar to the situation in the United States, if not more intractable. In the United 
States, though Missouri v. Holland was certainly narrow,218 the Supreme Court did 
not give such definitive treatment to the question of whether federalism principles 
                                                                                                                 
 
 210. Id. at 248 (citations omitted). 
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 213. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 37. 
 214. Kibel, supra note 203, at 250. 
 215. See id. at 249. 
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constrain the treaty power. Furthermore, the situation in Canada presents the polar 
opposite scenario to that in Australia, where courts have interpreted the 
Commonwealth government’s “external affairs” power quite broadly. After 
combining the explicit constitutional grant of regulatory authority over forests to 
the provinces with the fact that the Canadian treaty power is definitively restricted 
by reserved provincial powers, it becomes clear that Canada is currently even more 
restricted in international negotiations regarding forests than is the United States. 
Indeed, “[w]hile the United States Constitution actually contemplates a system that 
values the importance of the nation’s being able to implement its treaties, the 
Canadian constitutional framework appears to subordinate international concerns to 
domestic separation of legislative competence.”219 Furthermore, and again unlike 
U.S. courts, “Canadian courts have consistently extended rather than diminished 
provincial power.”220  
Thus, the Canadian national government, though maintaining institutional 
enforcement capacity (element 3) as a general matter,221 currently has neither 
constitutional primacy over forest management (element 1) nor any resulting 
national sharing of constitutional forest authority (element 2). 
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership 
Ninety-three percent of Canada’s forests are publicly owned, with provincial 
governments responsible for regulating both the 7% of privately owned forests and 
the 77% of forests in provincial ownership.222 As a result, the national government 
only maintains constitutional authority to regulate the 16% of public forests in 
national ownership.223 Because the provinces are in charge of regulating both 
private and public forests,224 as in the United States, forest ownership may affect 
the shape of an international climate treaty that includes forests. In Canada, 
however, it is subnational public ownership rather than private ownership that 
constrains the Canadian national government in treaty negotiations. Subnational 
constitutional primacy over forests combined with the vast provincial ownership of 
forests likely means the national government would be legally prohibited from 
implementing certain potential international forest management obligations on a 
vast majority of forests within its borders. 
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D. India 
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement 
Like the Canadian and Brazilian Constitutions, the Indian Constitution explicitly 
addresses forest protection, with Article 48A declaring that the government “shall 
endeavor to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and 
wildlife of the country.”225 Article 51-A(g) states that “[i]t shall be the duty of 
every citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including 
forests . . . .”226 The central government’s role over forests has increased over time, 
and in 1972 the 42nd amendment to the Constitution granted concurrent oversight 
over forests to the national and state governments, further “empowering the central 
government to have decisive decision-making authority over management of the 
nation’s forests.”227 In the event that national and state legislation clash, as in 
Brazil, “the Union enjoys a primacy over States in that its legislation in the Union 
and the Concurrent List prevails over State legislations.”228 The Union capitalized 
on this recentralization of forest authority by passing the Forest Conservation Act 
of 1980,229 which further “increased centralized control by making it mandatory to 
obtain permission from the central government for converting forest land to 
non-forest uses.”230 Indeed, the National Forest Policy of 1988231 “is driven by 
top-down targets, with the national government setting clear objectives” with the 
goal of achieving forest cover on one-third of the total land area.232 Thus, it is clear 
that in India the national government has constitutional primacy over forests 
(element 1) to act as a fail-safe for forest management.  
Despite this strong national constitutional authority, however, India’s 
constitution also incorporates a decentralized approach to forest management—at 
least on paper—granting a great degree of regulatory authority to its thirty-five 
state governments. Like Australia, India’s governance structure can thus be 
characterized as the national government purposefully ceding authority via 
decentralization as a policy choice for improved forest management—thus 
establishing a framework for national sharing of constitutional forest policy 
authority (element 2). In fact, India has actually taken its national sharing of 
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constitutional forest authority further than simply decentralizing to the state 
government level. The 73rd and 74th amendments to the constitution require states 
to decentralize forest regulatory authority to even lower levels of government—
local governmental units known as “panchayats.”233 The national fail-safe authority 
operates concurrently with this local authority, as federal agencies continue to 
mandate policy at the subnational level in areas such as forest fire control and 
long-term forest management planning.234 
Ultimately, India’s constitutional structure establishes both national 
constitutional primacy (element 1) and national sharing of constitutional forest 
policy authority (element 2). The effects of these elements are evident specifically 
in the context of international treaty making. International agreements have had a 
direct impact on the forest sector planning process in India—again, at least on 
paper—signifying that national government adoption of international protocols is 
not hampered by subnational government interference.235  
Like Brazil, however, India is missing the key element of institutional 
enforcement capacity (element 3). Enforcement capabilities are hampered by the 
budgetary constraints of a developing country and “[i]nadequate resources 
seriously constrain the implementation of the National Forest Policy.”236 India also 
ranks low on rule of law and environmental regulatory regime indices, as it 
struggles with corruption and lack of enforcement.237 So even though India has a 
“well-articulated forest policy, its translation into a feasible strategy has been 
slow.”238 As a result, “[i]nstitutional reform in forestry needs to be pursued with 
great vigour.”239  
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership 
Ninety-seven percent of all forests in India are publicly owned, and roughly 
85% of forests are managed by the state governments.240 Government forests “are 
managed either directly by state institutions or granted in usufruct to private entities 
or to communities under a variety of arrangements.”241 Ultimately, due to the high 
proportion of publicly owned forests and the national government’s constitutional 
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authority to direct management on state-owned forests, the public/private forest 
ownership divide does not limit India’s options in entering into and implementing 
an international treaty that includes forest management. 
E. Russia 
1. Constitutional Primacy, National Sharing, and Institutional Enforcement 
Russia alone accounts for more than 25% of the standing forests worldwide.242 
The Russian Federation Constitution243 establishes a hierarchy of legal authorities, 
with the constitution being the supreme legal authority.244 Treaties to which the 
Russian Federation agrees are incorporated into this supreme authority, as Article 
15.4 of the constitution declares that “norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of its 
legal system. If an international treaty of the Russian Federation establishes other 
rules than those stipulated by the law, the rules of the international treaty shall 
apply.”245 So not only does the national government maintain broad authority to 
negotiate and implement treaties, but treaties are also constitutionally declared to 
trump domestic legislation in the event that the two conflict—setting a firm legal 
foundation for an unconstrained national government in treaty negotiations.246  
The Russian Constitution establishes areas of sole national jurisdiction and areas 
of joint jurisdiction between the national and subnational governments (known as 
“subjects”).247 Article 72 declares that areas of concurrent jurisdiction include 
“issues of possession, use and disposal of land, subsoil, water and other natural 
resources . . . land, water, and forest legislation.”248 The Russian Federation’s 
stance on forest policy, however, is that though subject governments may have 
their own forest legislation, it must not conflict with national forest legislation.249 
This policy, combined with the broad treaty power, clearly establishes national 
constitutional primacy over forest management (element 1), especially in the 
context of international agreements. Indeed, the Russian Constitution, distinct from 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. Natalia V. Malysheva, Main Features of Russia’s Forest Management System, in 
THE POLITICS OF DECENTRALIZATION: FORESTS, PEOPLE AND POWER, supra note 8, at 229, 
230. 
 243. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] (Russ.). 
 244. MINNA PAPPILA, INT’L INST. FOR APP. SYS., IR-99-058, THE RUSSIAN FOREST SECTOR 
AND LEGISLATION IN TRANSITION 2–3 (1999).  
 245. KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 15.4 
(Russ.) (emphasis added).  
 246. Gennady M. Danilenko, The New Russian Constitution and International Law, 88 
AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 453, 465−66 (1994). 
 247. There are eighty-three subnational units of government in Russia, called “subjects.” 
Migara O. De Silva, Galina Kurlyandskaya, Elena Andreeva & Natalia Golovanova, 
Intergovernmental Reforms in the Russian Federation: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 
THE WORLD BANK (2009), available at 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/2668/501730PUB0Inte1IC0di
sclosed0Aug0261.txt?sequence=2. 
 248.  KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 72 (Russ.). 
 249. PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 21. 
2012] THE ROLE OF FORESTS 1503 
 
other constitutions here reviewed, “confirms the current trend in Russian practice of 
giving a prominent place to international legal standards in the domestic legal 
setting.”250 
The primary forest legislation in Russia is the Russian Forest Code of 2007.251 
The Code has been credited as a direct attempt by the national government to 
decentralize Russian forest policy, demonstrating national sharing of constitutional 
forest policy authority (element 2).252 Yet it is clear that the Code leaves in place 
ultimate national control over both public and private forest regulation, as the 
national government delegates some forest regulatory tasks to the subject 
governments, but explicitly reserves for itself final authority over forest standard 
setting.253 Article 83 of the Forest Code states that the “authorised federal executive 
body shall have the right to issue enactments on exercising the powers delegated to 
the public authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation, as well as 
mandatory guidelines and instructions on exercising such powers by the executive 
authorities of the Subjects of the Russian Federation.”254 The national government 
must approve the methods by which a subject utilizes delegated authority and must 
also approve the appointment of subject executive heads exercising delegated 
powers.255 The national government also oversees legislation passed by subject 
governments pursuant to their delegated powers, retaining the right to “issue 
mandatory prescriptions to invalidate enactments of Subjects of the Russian 
Federation or to amend them,” and even maintains the power to “prepare proposals 
on withdrawal of respective powers from the public authorities of the Subjects” and 
to have those powers revoked.256 Areas of forest regulation that in the United States 
are the role of state and local governments, such as zoning for forestry activities 
and regulation of clear-cutting, are ultimately administered by federal agencies in 
Russia.257 For example, the national government can go so far as to prohibit clear-
cutting altogether.258 Thus, governance of forests in Russia has been described as 
remaining “de facto quite centralized”259 under its broad national constitutional 
primacy (element 1), even though it has established the legal framework for 
decentralized sharing of national constitutional authority (element 2). 
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 251. LESNOI KODEKS ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [LK RF] (Forestry Code) [hereinafter Forest 
Code], available at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/FOR/forest_cdrom/downloads/Forest_ 
code/ForestCode-3rdReading-061108-eng.pdf.  
 252. Contreras-Hermosilla, et al., supra note 115, at 10. 
 253. The federal government maintains primary regulatory authority for various forest 
activities, such as restrictions on clear-cutting (Article 17), forest uses (Article 27), 
reforestation (Article 62), development of forest management planning procedures (Article 
67), and at least fifty other forest management activities (Articles 81 and 82). Forest Code, 
supra note 251, art. 17, 27, 62, 67. 
 254. Id. at art. 83-8. 
 255. Id. at art. 83-9. 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. at art. 15, 17. 
 258. Id. at art. 17-6. 
 259. CONTRERAS-HERMOSILLA ET AL., supra note 17, at 3.  
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Similar to Brazil and India, however, Russia lacks adequate institutional 
enforcement capacity (element 3), inhibiting the national government’s ability to 
utilize the great degree of legal authority it maintains over forest management.260 
This lack is because the “division of powers between the center and subjects is still 
unclear . . . and administrative competencies are not well defined.”261 Specifically 
in the forest sector, an “[u]nclear hierarchy of laws, division of powers, and 
contradicting laws affect the credibility” of forest legislation and further 
complicates implementation of legislation.262 Overlapping jurisdictions have led to 
conflicts between national and subject governments, as some subjects “claim that 
their own constitution is superior to the federal constitution” and that certain areas 
constitutionally designated as joint jurisdiction are in fact areas of exclusive subject 
jurisdiction, resulting in inconsistencies in local forest laws and national 
legislation.263  
Scholars have recognized that in countries where the central government owns 
most forest resources, like Russia, central agency control and overall governance of 
forests is weak, whereas governance is stronger in countries where subnational 
governments own the resource, like Canada.264 A causal link between which level 
of government owns the resource and the quality of management is not necessary to 
explain that descriptive result, however, as whether the national government 
maintains institutional enforcement capacity regardless of ownership may be of 
greater importance. Russia does not maintain such capacity, as its young federation 
is still battling elements of corruption, unclear constitutional balance and separation 
of powers, and a weak judiciary.265 Indeed, the Forest Code of 2007 “appears to 
undermine Russia’s capacity to realise its international legal commitments and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 260. The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index rates Russia fifty-first out of sixty-six 
countries studied for the absence of corruption and fiftieth out of sixty-six for regulatory 
enforcement. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, supra note 164, at 90. Russia also has a negative 
score on the Environmental Regulatory Regimes Index developed by Yale and Columbia 
Universities. See supra note 164. 
 261. PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 5. Also noting that “[t]here are doubts whether Russian 
federalism really works” and “whether the law-making powers are really clear in Russia.” Id. 
at 2.  
 262. Id. at 2. 
 263. Id. at 5. Scholars have noted that “[t]he federal government has no means of prior 
surveillance of local legislation in order to avoid inconsistencies. The only way to control 
that regional law does not contradict the Russian Constitution or federal laws is to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court, which takes approximately five years.” Id. In addition, Article 78 
of the constitution allows the federal executive branch to enter into administrative 
agreements to transfer powers to subject executives, as long as the transfer does not conflict 
with the Russian Constitution or federal laws. Though these agreements were intended to 
make the division of powers between the federal and subject governments more clear, 
scholars have suggested they have had the opposite effect and have blurred the mandates of 
the constitution, as in some agreements the federal government has given powers granted to 
it exclusively by the constitution to subject governments. Id. at 6. 
 264. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 6. 
 265. Again, these problems are a separate question from whether the central government 
maintains an adequate constitutional framework, regardless of who controls the resource, to 
implement important national legislation on forests. 
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agreements” since it is “convoluted, vague and frequently in contradiction to the 
sincere efforts by many to realise sustainable forest legal mechanisms for the 21st 
century.”266 Ultimately, like Brazil and India, Russia maintains elements 1 and 2, 
and therefore maintains much of what would otherwise provide a sufficient 
constitutional framework for participating in international climate and forest 
negotiations as well as retaining the benefits of decentralized forest governance. 
Yet, lack of element 3 inhibits enforcement of the Russian Federation’s 
constitutional authority. 
2. Public/Private Forest Ownership 
An overwhelming majority of Russian forests are owned by the national 
government.267 Article 9 of the constitution gives the Russian Federation the power 
to protect land and natural resources “as the basis of the life and activity of the 
people living in corresponding territories.”268 Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court has 
ruled that direct land use regulation is a “quintessential state and local power,”269 
Article 36 of the Russian Constitution explicitly grants land use regulatory 
authority to the national government in the area of the environment, stating that 
private property owners have the right to “possess, utilize, and dispose of land and 
other natural resources provided that this does not damage the environment and 
does not violate the rights and legitimate interests of others.”270  
The current Russian Constitution no longer places restrictions on private 
ownership of property, as it had done in the past, and Article 9 allows land and 
other natural resources to be in private, state, municipal, and other forms of 
ownership.271 Similarly, the 2007 Forest Code now allows for privatization of 
forest resources.272 At the time of the 1997 Forest Code, private forest ownership 
was actually illegal, as was subject regulation of private property owners’ 
management of forest resources.273 The privatization of other forms of property, 
however, has occurred much more quickly than forest privatization, and though the 
current forest code allows for privatization, the national government still controls 
virtually all of the country’s forests.274 Because the national government remains 
both the primary owner of forests and the primary regulator of public and private 
forest management, forest ownership distribution in Russia is not an impediment to 
the Russian Federation’s ability to enter into and implement a climate treaty aimed 
at forest management. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 266. TAIGA RESCUE NETWORK, COMMENTS ON THE NEW RUSSIAN FOREST CODE 3 (2007), 
available at http://www.taigarescue.org/_v3/files/pdf/201.pdf. 
 267. GREGERSEN ET AL., supra note 20, at 41. 
 268.  KONSTITUTSIIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 9 (Russ.). 
 269. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 738 (2006). 
 270. PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 7. 
 271. Id. 
 272. TAIGA RESCUE NETWORK, supra note 266, at 1. 
 273. See PAPPILA, supra note 244, at 8. 
 274. Id. at 7–8.  
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V. SURVEY SUMMARY AND SITUATING FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS WITHIN 
THE POLICY FORMULATION/IMPLEMENTATION MATRIX 
The foregoing comparative constitutional analysis, as depicted in Chart 1 and 
Figure 2 below, demonstrates that only Australia maintains all three elements 
within its constitutional structure that most readily facilitate federal nation-state 
agreement on the widest range of international negotiations on forests, successful 
treaty implementation, and the preservation of decentralized forest policy-making 
authority.  
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Chart 1 Elements of Federal Constitutional Structure Most Conducive for Balancing Global Forest Governance With Decentralized Policy-making 
Federal 
Nations 
1) National 
Constitutional 
Primacy 
2) National Sharing 
of Constitutional 
Authority 
3) Institutional 
Enforcement 
Capacity 
Australia X X X 
India X X  
Brazil X X  
Russia X X  
Canada   X 
United States   X 
 
 
 
 
Australia maintains national constitutional primacy (element 1) over both 
publicly and privately owned forests through its “external affairs” power, yet it 
shares this authority with the states and territories, as evidenced by the 
Inter-Governmental Agreement on the Environment, the National Forest Policy 
Statement, and various Regional Forest Agreements, in order to achieve optimum 
forest management on local scales (element 2). Australia also maintains sufficient 
institutional enforcement capacity (element 3), since Australia is not plagued by 
inadequate legal and enforcement institutions. The Australian national 
government’s control over all subnationally owned forests via its “external affairs” 
power means that the public/private forest ownership divide depicted in Figure 1 
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does not operate as a significant legal obstacle for international climate and forest 
negotiations. 
Brazil, India, and Russia, meanwhile, maintain only two key elements. Brazil’s 
constitution explicitly establishes national constitutional primacy (element 1) over 
all subnational forest management through its provisions allowing the 
“supervenience” of national laws over contrary state laws and the general 
constitutional deference afforded the national government by Brazilian courts. New 
laws aimed at transferring approval and enforcement of forest management plans to 
state environmental agencies, increased focus on greater subnational involvement 
in forest regulation at both the national and subnational levels, and explicit 
constitutional concurrence over forest policy also demonstrate a framework of 
national sharing of forest policy authority (element 2). Brazil, however, is missing 
the crucial element of institutional enforcement capacity (element 3) because 
prosecutorial apathy, a weak judiciary, general corruption, deficient legal 
structures, severe budgetary constraints, and other institutional problems hamper 
enforcement. In addition, the high proportion of private ownership of forests in 
Brazil, as in the United States, affects implementation of forest policy at the 
national level. This effect, however, is due solely to a lack of enforcement, rather 
than a lack of national government legal authority over private lands, as is the case 
in the United States. Thus, the constitutional framework is in place for the Brazilian 
national government to prevent Brazil’s high degree of private forest ownership 
from limiting the range of options in international climate and forest negotiations.  
Amendments to the Indian Constitution allowing concurrent oversight over 
forests and legislative acts passed pursuant to that authority—the Forest 
Conservation Act of 1980 and the National Forest Policy of 1988—have resulted in 
national constitutional primacy over forest management (element 1). India also has 
robust national sharing of constitutional authority (element 2), as its constitution 
mandates that regional (state) governments must decentralize forest policy making 
to even lower levels of government. Even so, budgetary constraints, corruption, and 
other regulatory enforcement issues cause a lack of institutional enforcement 
capacity in India (element 3). Due to the high proportion of public ownership of 
forests and the national government’s authority to direct management on state and 
other subnationally owned forests, however, the public/private ownership divide 
does not negatively affect India’s legal capacity to enter into and implement an 
international climate treaty that includes direct forest management standards. 
Russia also maintains national constitutional primacy (element 1), as subject 
government legislation on forests must not conflict with national mandates, and the 
Russian Federation has a sweeping treaty power. The Russian Forest Code of 2007 
also encapsulates a national sharing of constitutional authority (element 2). Due to 
a confusing hierarchy of laws, unclear division of powers, and contradictory 
national and subnational laws, however, Russia lacks adequate institutional 
enforcement capacity (element 3)—even though national ownership of an 
overwhelming majority of the forests in Russia causes the public/private forest 
ownership divide not to be an impediment to the Russian national government 
during international negotiations. 
Canada, like the United States, only maintains one key element: institutional 
enforcement capacity (element 3). Various provisions of the Canadian Constitution 
provide subnational constitutional primacy over forests, and the Canadian national 
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government, like the U.S. government, has refused to attempt an extension of its 
other constitutional powers over nonfederal forests. Subnational primacy over 
forest policy, combined with the vast subnational ownership of forests, means that 
the public/private ownership divide in Canada, as in the United States, places a 
limit the national government’s options during international negotiations, as the 
national government would be constrained in implementing international 
obligations on a vast majority of forests within its borders.  
The preceding review demonstrates that the public/private forest ownership 
divide presented in Figure 1 only legally constrains the United States and Canada in 
international negotiations on forests. Even then, the constraint is a result of the 
other axis of analysis shown in Figure 1—that is, the constraint results from the 
split in national and subnational constitutional authority over forests. Subnational 
governments maintain constitutional primacy for regulating the majority of U.S. 
forests, which are privately owned. Similarly, the Canadian Provinces, the regulator 
with constitutional primacy over all subnationally owned forests in Canada, 
actually own a majority of the nation’s forests. This indicates that the 
national/subnational primacy divide over decentralized forest governance has the 
greatest impact on international negotiations of the two axes (see Figure 1).  
Recent research establishes a framework for analyzing the consequences of 
federal systems lacking the above-described elements of forest policy formulation 
and implementation, with both domestic and international implications.275 Indeed, 
the global forest policy/decentralized forest governance elements, though useful 
descriptors of federal forest-management governance structures, are more properly 
categorized as subsidiary elements of a new, broader theory of policy design and 
success.276 This framework facilitates a more focused study of the drivers of policy 
failure and the areas of domestic governance upon which attention should be 
concentrated to improve the policy-making process, including a focus not only on 
political will, but also on the legal institutions that facilitate policy formulation, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 275. See Blake Hudson, Federal Constitutions: The Keystone of Nested Commons 
Governance, 63 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 276. See generally PEARL ELIANDIS, MARGARET M. HILL & MICHAEL HOWLETT, 
DESIGNING GOVERNMENT: FROM INSTRUMENTS TO GOVERNANCE (2005); MICHAEL HOWLETT, 
DESIGNING PUBLIC POLICIES: PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS (2011); ALLAN MCCONNELL, 
UNDERSTANDING POLICY SUCCESS: RETHINKING PUBLIC POLICY (2010); David Marsh & 
Allan McConnell, Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success, 88 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
564 (2010); Allan McConnell, Policy Success, Policy Failure and Grey Areas In-Between, 
30 J. PUB. POL’Y 345 (2010). A recurring theme in policy design is that it is often unclear 
what the aim of policy design should be. Though “design for success” seems like an obvious 
goal, what are the preconditions of policy “success”? The theory put forth in this section, and 
to be further developed in future research, sets forth the parameters of successful policy 
design preconditions. Such a theory furthers McDermott, Cashore, and Kanowski’s call for 
“a new generation of systematic research into forest policy questions” which notes the 
“value of a new direction for policy studies in general, and global forest policy development 
in particular.” MCDERMOTT ET AL., supra note 10, at 6–7. Such research might “promote a 
more common global approach to the fundamentals of sustainable forest practices” which 
can “only help facilitate broader learning and knowledge generation within both practitioner 
and scholarly communities that is a prerequisite to addressing the continuing loss and 
degradation of the world’s forests.” Id. at 7. 
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such as federal constitutions. Though a great amount of research has been 
performed on the policy-making process, including the linear progression of agenda 
setting, policy formation, decision making, implementation, and policy 
evaluation,277 scant attention has been given to the overarching framework in which 
this linear process operates. In other words, a requisite level of institutional and 
political capacity must be maintained by systems of government before they can 
engage in linear policy formation that begins with an idea for policy and ends with 
its successful implementation and evaluation. The requisite level of institutional 
and political capacity necessary for successful policy formulation and 
implementation can be represented by a Venn matrix (Figure 3, below) containing 
four intersecting components: (1) the government’s institutional capacity to 
formulate policy, (2) the government’s political will to formulate policy, (3) the 
government’s institutional capacity to enforce policy, and (4) the government’s 
political will to enforce policy.  
As the above review demonstrates, governmental systems can contain any 
combination of these components, but the presence of all four components provides 
the necessary framework for successful policy making. As seen in Figure 3, at the 
intersection of institutional capacity to formulate and to enforce, we can say a 
sufficient policy-making institution exists. At the intersection of political will to 
formulate and to enforce, we can say that sufficient policy-making political will 
exists. Similarly, a governmental system may have both institutional capacity and 
political will to formulate policy, leading to successful policy formulation, or both 
institutional capacity and political will to enforce, leading to successful policy 
implementation. When all four are present, the government has achieved a 
successful policy.278  
So where does the study undertaken in this Article of federal constitutional 
authority to formulate forest policy fall within this matrix? If we define the 
“institution” for these purposes as constitutional authority at the national level to 
formulate forest policy, then component 1 of Figure 3 is our focus. Indeed, 
component 1 of the matrix subsumes element 1 of the global forest 
governance/decentralized forest policy balance (national constitutional primacy). 
Without the national government first maintaining the institution of constitutional 
authority, institutional capacity to enforce, political will to formulate, and political 
will to implement policy are irrelevant.279  
                                                                                                                 
 
 277. See MICHAEL HOWLETT, M. RAMESH & ANTHONY PERL, STUDYING PUBLIC POLICY: 
POLICY CYCLES & POLICY SUBSYSTEMS (2009).  
 278. Of course, whether the policy that “succeeds” is qualitatively “good” or “bad” and 
whether it fairly represents the will of the entire corpus of civil society rather than merely 
interest groups or the politically elite is a separate question from whether the fundamental 
ingredients exist for actual formulation and implementation of a particular policy. Questions 
of civil society inputs are affected by broader democratic processes and design of 
governmental structure. 
 279. At first blush one might consider the Policy Formulation and Implementation matrix 
also to be a linear process. It may appear that components 3 and 4 cannot exist unless 
components 1 and 2 first exist. In other words, how can a government enforce and 
implement a policy that does not yet exist? The resolution of constitutional law questions, 
however, is quite often nonlinear. Governments may maintain the political will to formulate 
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Figure 3 
 
 
Take an illustration from the United States, for instance. The United States 
offers many examples whereby the Constitution provides federal regulatory 
authority over some subject matter (component 1), Congress maintains the political 
will to pass legislation pursuant to that authority (component 2), and the federal 
government maintains the institutional capacity and political will to enforce that 
legislation (components 3 and 4). The Clean Air Act (CAA)280 provides one 
example, passed pursuant to federal Commerce Clause authority over industrial 
pollutants, and enacted as a result of the strong political will to regulate air 
pollution during the 1970s. The federal government has further successfully 
utilized a variety of administrative institutions, such as the Environmental 
                                                                                                                 
policy (component 2), believing they have sufficient institutional (constitutional) capacity to 
formulate it (component 1). They may even set up institutions to administer and enforce the 
policy (components 3 and 4). Even so, sometime later the legislation may be challenged in 
the courts as unconstitutional. If it is found to be so, then the “retroactive” absence of 
component 1 renders policy making unsuccessful. Examples are the statutes at issue in the 
Lopez (United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) and Morrison cases (United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)) where the Court struck down as unconstitutional statutes 
already passed by Congress and already put into implementation. 
 280. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671 (2006). 
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Protection Agency and state agencies, to enforce the CAA and improve national air 
quality.281  
Domestic forest policies, on the other hand, provide a case study of how federal 
systems can maintain different combinations of policy formulation/implementation 
components, leading to divergent outcomes regarding a national government’s 
ability to formulate policy as a resource management fail-safe in the event that 
subnational governments do not adequately manage the resource. As demonstrated 
above, the Brazilian, Indian, and Russian Constitutions all maintain explicit 
constitutional provisions related to forest protection, with Brazil in particular 
maintaining some of the most stringent national-level forest protection mandates in 
any federal constitution.282 Thus, each of these systems maintains component 1 
(institutional capacity to formulate forest management policy). In addition, each of 
these federal systems maintains component 2 because each has politically 
capitalized on its institutional capacity by formulating national forest policy 
legislation.  
Even so, each nation is missing crucial components of policy implementation 
and enforcement (components 3 and 4, which effectively subsume element 3 in the 
global forest governance/decentralized forest policy balance). These national 
governments are unable to enforce legislation passed pursuant to their broad 
constitutional powers over forests because each is plagued by some 
implementation/enforcement malady, such as a weak judiciary, lack of financial 
resources, lack of enforcement culture, corruption, unclear division of powers 
between different levels of government, and unclear separation of powers between 
branches of government. National policies will not be successful without these 
crucial components of policy implementation and enforcement.  
The U.S. and Canadian federal systems, on the other hand, present quite the 
opposite scenario regarding national-level forest policy making, as each maintain 
sufficient enforcement and implementation capabilities (components 3 and 4), but 
neither maintains institutional capacity to formulate policy (component 1)—a 
scenario arising directly out of their chosen forms of constitutional federalism. In 
the future, the U.S. and Canadian national governments may very well gain the 
political will to formulate a national forest policy applicable to privately, state, and 
provincially owned forests (component 2), and may also maintain both the 
institutional capacity (component 3) and political will (component 4) to enforce 
such a policy. Yet, the presence of those three components is irrelevant if the 
constitution does not grant the national government legal authority to formulate 
policy in the first instance (component 1). Thus, the policy will either never be 
formulated, or even if it is formulated—and regardless of whether it actually 
succeeds on the ground—it may be challenged and later held unconstitutional by 
the courts.  
It is lack of institutional capacity to formulate policy—arising out of 
constitutional structure—that affects not only the ability of federal systems like 
                                                                                                                 
 
 281. Of course, the degree of the success can be debated, as some areas of the country 
remain in nonattainment with the CAA. Even so, there is no doubt that air quality has 
improved under the CAA.  
 282. See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 23, 24, 225 (Braz.).  
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those of the United States and Canada to formulate national domestic forest 
policies, but also prevents their participation in the full range of global forest 
governance approaches to addressing climate change. It is important to situate the 
U.S. and Canadian constitutional orders within this policy 
formulation/implementation matrix so that scholars can undertake a clearer and 
more focused study of the drivers of law and policy failure, and how those drivers 
may be adjusted to achieve success—which is the goal of the companion piece of 
scholarship to this Article, titled Fail-safe Federalism and Climate Change: The 
Case of U.S. and Canadian Forest Policy.283  
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, we see that in the context of international forest negotiations, the 
concept that “[f]ederalism and a spirited foreign policy go ill together”284 need not 
apply, in a legal sense, to countries with all three key elements, like Australia. 
Countries with the Australian model of constitutional structure maintain the ability, 
via national constitutional primacy, to enter into an international agreement on 
forests without concern over potential subnational legal interference. They also 
have adequate institutional enforcement capacity to ensure implementation, and 
they voluntarily share forest authority with subnational governments to preserve the 
benefits of decentralized forest management. This is true within a legal sense 
because whether such countries politically choose to allow federalism to bode ill 
for their foreign policy is a separate question from whether the legal institution that 
facilitates political will (the constitution) allows conformation to foreign policy 
objectives. 
Similarly, Brazil, India, and Russia maintain the institutional framework for 
both national constitutional primacy and national sharing of constitutional 
authority, but they do not have institutional enforcement capacity. Lack of this 
element hampers their ability to implement an international agreement and thus 
may give rise to apathy at the negotiating table and political interference with legal 
objectives. It also prevents the benefits of decentralized forest governance from 
being realized. 
Without national constitutional primacy over all forests, the United States and 
Canada will have difficulties engaging fully in global climate change governance 
and entering into certain types of binding treaties that include forest management, 
especially ones that mandate particular forms of prescriptive or minimum standard 
setting regulation. Furthermore, without the sharing of constitutional authority that 
can flow from national constitutional primacy, the U.S. and Canadian national 
governments may not effectively balance the benefits of centralized forest 
management planning with decentralized management domestically.  
Scholars have adequately assessed, and are currently exploring, the implications 
of weak constitutional structure, apathetic judiciaries, corruption, and other 
institutional problems in countries like Brazil, India, and Russia—governance 
characteristics that lead to a lack of institutional enforcement capacity on forest 
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policy (element 3). Scholars, however, have failed to assess how the domestic 
constitutional orders of countries like the United States and Canada might be 
adjusted to leave all of the legal and policy response tools on the table for global 
climate and forest governance. The companion article in this line of research285 
undertakes that endeavor and explores both the implications of, and solutions to, 
the absence of elements 1 and 2 in the United States and Canada. The article 
explores how the U.S. and Canadian federal constitutional frameworks can be 
strengthened in order to forge “Fail-safe Federalism”286 that facilitates more 
successful negotiation of an international agreement on global forest management 
and climate change.  
The mechanisms for achieving this adjustment can take many forms.287 Some 
mechanisms arise directly out of national or subnational initiative and utilize 
existing constitutional processes, falling within the categories of top-down, 
horizontal, and bilateral. A top-down approach would allow the national 
government to gain inputs into subnational forest policy by directly utilizing 
current constitutional mechanisms, such as constitutional amendment or expanded 
interpretation of other national government constitutional powers. A bilateral 
approach would require the national government to provide incentives or 
disincentives—legislative or otherwise—to subnational governments, encouraging 
them to voluntarily adopt national standards on forest management related to 
climate change mitigation. A horizontal approach would involve subnational 
governments agreeing with other subnational governments to take collective action 
to address forest management in the context of climate-change mitigation—even in 
the absence of a top-down mandate (though this approach may still be induced by 
bilateral incentives). Though a horizontal approach would not result from direct 
national inputs into subnational forest management standards, it may render the 
fail-safe role of the national government unnecessary and also create a de facto 
national constitutional primacy that gives the national government more flexibility 
during international negotiations related to forests. In other words, the states would 
voluntarily bind themselves to a position that does not restrain the national 
government in international negotiations on climate and forests, but that rather 
reinforces the goals of the global governance regime. And, of course, all three of 
these approaches may overlap to varying degrees. 
Sometimes, however, the internal circumstances within a federal system are not 
readily conducive to top-down, bilateral, or horizontal mechanisms of adjusting 
constitutional structure. Other means of achieving those adjustments may arise 
from external pressures that civil society places on individual governments to take 
action. These “pathways of transnational impacts”288 on domestic governance can 
result in shifts in constitutional structure related to forest management if civil 
society is able to successfully sustain pressure along each pathway, or along key 
combinations of pathways.289 
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In the end, one of the approaches outlined above is warranted to adjust 
constitutional structure in the United States and Canada, as well as perhaps other 
federal systems not here reviewed—if, that is, these systems place value on 
international treaty making and global governance to address climate change via 
utilization of the world’s forest. Most federal constitutions provide a “treaty power” 
in one form or another. As a result, these countries already—at least on paper—
value global governance to a certain degree, having provided a constitutional tool 
authorizing the national government to participate in international agreements. 
Given that federal systems controlling important forest resources maintain 
constitutional structures that allow subnational governments to constrain 
international climate change negotiations, the need for creative constitutional 
methods facilitating effective global environmental governance has never been 
more apparent. Though regulation of land use activities like private forest 
management may have historically been the “quintessential” state and local 
government role, climate change is now the “quintessential” global challenge. 
Forging national level fail-safes within the constitutional orders of forested federal 
systems will allow the ultimate source of legal authority in these countries, the 
constitution, to recognize that which science already does—that local forests have 
impacts beyond subnational and national political boundaries; impacts felt on the 
other side of the globe. 
 
